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Introduction 
“In all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof 
lies may be decisive of the outcome.”1 
 
This term, in the case of Jennings v. Rodriguez,2 the Supreme Court 
will consider whether mandatory detention applies to noncitizens whose 
removal proceedings have become prolonged. Should the Court grant 
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1. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). 
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jennings v. Rodriquez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) 
(No. 15-1204). 
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these detainees a right to a bond hearing, it will decide who should bear 
the burden of proof at that hearing. Currently, the approximately 
60,000 detainees per year who are eligible for a bond hearing3 must bear 
the burden of proving that they are not a danger to the community or 
a flight risk. The government, which took away their liberty, need not 
justify why they should remain detained. Yet, in the removal 
proceedings in which these bond hearings take place, the government 
must prove removability by clear and convincing evidence.4 It is the 
government that seeks law’s intervention in both contexts,5 yet it only 
needs to justify its deportation decision, not its detention decision. 
In this Article, I examine the burden of proof in bond proceedings. 
I apply theories for why burdens of proof exist in the law to demonstrate 
why the government should bear the burden of proof. I also argue that 
in order to ensure that such detention comports with Due Process, the 
government must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a 
detainee is dangerous and a flight risk. This presumption of freedom 
previously existed, yet was eviscerated by the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in a 1997 regulation and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals in a 1999 decision. Although the idea that the 
detainee must bear the burden of proof in bond hearings has become 
the norm, this Article seeks to explain how this burden shift occurred 
and, in doing so, exposes this troubling aspect of today’s bond hearings. 
 
3. See Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom 
from Pre-Trial Immigration Detention 3 (U. of Texas Sch. of Law, Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 644, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2737416 [https://perma.cc/G6YK-7UA8] (describing 60,000 as a 
“conservative estimate”). 
4. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (“[N]o deportation order may 
be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence 
that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.”). In 2009, the 
Supreme Court described the standard as “clear and convincing evidence,” 
due to a statutory codification of the standard as “clear and convincing.” 
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) (providing “clear and convincing” evidence standard); 
Mondaca-Vega v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d on 
reh’g, Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e hold 
that the two formulations of the government’s burden in removal pro-
ceedings that have appeared in our cases both require the same intermediate 
quantum of proof.”); accord Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) 
(holding that for civil commitment, the state must prove mental illness and 
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, but that the use of the term 
“unequivocal” is not constitutionally required). For the purposes of this 
Article, I will use “clear and convincing” evidence as the standard for 
deportability.  
5. See Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse 23 
(Yale Univ. Press 1992) (writing that under traditional legal theory, the party 
who seeks the law’s intervention is the party who bears the burden of proof). 
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This Article examines a problem that is understudied in the scholar-
ship. Many have examined the constitutionality of mandatory de-
tention, the product of a 1996 statute whereby certain classes of de-
tainees, primarily those who are removable for criminal conduct, may 
be held with no bond hearing.6 Alina Das has discussed why placing the 
burden of proof on the detainee is problematic as an institutional design 
because pro se detainees often do not have access to the information 
needed to prove they are not a danger or a flight risk.7 Denise Gilman 
has argued that the burden allocation in bond hearings is uncon-
stitutional. She has focused her critique on how the immigration de-
tention system has failed to incorporate the movement away from 
monetary bonds and toward empirical study of risk factors in the 
criminal pretrial detention system.8 This scholarship does not, however, 
discuss why the burdens of proof between deportation and detention do 
not align, nor how theories behind the burden of proof allocation justify 
a government-borne burden of proof in bond hearings.9 Still others have 
 
6. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 601, 604 (2010) 
(arguing that “the current framework for mandatory detention is unfair and 
inefficient”); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without 
Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 149, 150 (2004) 
(“[R]ather than addressing some of the very real injustices of the post-9/11 
detention sweep, the executive branch is instead staking claim to even 
broader authority to detain noncitizens based on categorical determinations 
of dangerousness—without individual justification, administrative hearings, 
or constitutional review.”); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process 
Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1006–07 (2002) 
(exploring due process limitations on detention); Stephen H. Legomsky, The 
Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 531, 535 (1999) (suggesting that “relevant government officials 
make individualized, case-by-case determinations, after the person has had 
a fair opportunity to be heard[.]”). 
7. Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional 
Barriers to Reform, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 137, 156–58 (2013); see also Heeren, 
supra note 6, at 604 (contending that the current approach to mandatory 
detention does not accurately assess whether a person is a flight or security 
risk).  
8. See Gilman, supra note 3, at 28–38. Gilman also has argued that the U.S. 
immigration bond determinations are not in compliance with international 
human rights law. See Denise L. Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of 
International Human Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the 
United States, Fordham Int’l L.J. 244, 294 (2013).  
9. Frances Kreimer, critiquing certain features of the immigration detention 
system, briefly argues that the placement of the burden of proof on the 
detainee stands in stark contrast to procedures for pretrial detainees. See 
Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to 
Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1485, 1519–22 (2012) (critiquing certain features of the immigration system 
in comparison to features of the criminal pretrial system). Others have 
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argued that immigration detention itself is punishment,10 critiquing our 
“civil” detention system as not truly “civil” at all.11 In this Article, 
rather than questioning the Supreme Court’s classification of 
immigration detention as civil, I use these decisions to argue that, to 
be consistent with decisions concerning civil detention, the government 
should bear the burden of proof in bond proceedings. 
The burden of proof in bond hearings has started to receive some 
attention from courts.12 Advocates have spent two decades fighting for 
the right to a bond hearing; thus, as in the scholarship, mandatory 
 
critiqued the burden and standard of proof in so-called “Joseph” hearings, 
where a detainee must show that the government is substantially unlikely to 
prevail in its classification of a noncitizen as a mandatory detainee. See, e.g., 
Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive 
Less Process Than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 
Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1872 (2011) (comparing procedures for immigration 
detainees, which are less protective than those used for Guatanamo 
detainees’ cases, and arguing that the government should bear the burden of 
proof at a Joseph hearing); Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The 
Need for Procedural Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 51, 54 (2006) (arguing that the burden of 
proof in Joseph hearings violates Due Process); Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 
807 (B.I.A. 1999). 
10. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as 
Punishment, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1346, 1358 (2014) [hereinafter Immigration 
Detention as Punishment] (making a formalist, rules-based argument that 
immigration detention is punishment by rooting his argument in immigra-
tion detention’s legislative history); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration 
Detention, 110 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42, 49 (2010) (articulating 
functionalist critique that immigration detention has been converted “into a 
quasi-punitive regime far out of alignment with immigration custody’s 
permissible purposes”). César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández also has 
questioned how U.S. society has unnecessarily naturalized immigration 
detention as a norm. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing 
Immigration Imprisonment, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1449 (2015). 
11 See, e.g., Mark Noferi, Making Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and 
Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R. & 
Econ. Dev. 533 (2014) (finding that “civil” detention in the United States 
increasingly shares similar qualities to the criminal system).  
12. The Boston College Immigration Clinic, which I direct, recently brought a 
habeas case challenging the allocation of burden of proof in bond proceedings, 
raising some of the arguments addressed in this Article. Quinones v. Smith, 
1:16-CV-10427-GAO (D. Mass. May 2016). That case was dismissed without 
reaching the substance of the merits. See id. (granting motion to dismiss for 
lack of Article III standing). In addition, in litigation concerning whether the 
mandatory detention statute at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) precluded bond hearings 
when detainees were held in prolonged pretrial detention, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has placed the burden of proof on the government during 
bond hearings provided for detainees whose removal proceedings have 
extended beyond six months. See infra Part II.C. 
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detention has been the primary dragon to slay.13 Thanks to numerous 
successful court challenges, many detainees have won the right to a 
bond hearing before an immigration judge.14 We are now at a time when 
courts are considering the procedures and substance of bond hearings.15 
It is unsurprising that the Court, when it accepted certiorari in 
Jennings v. Rodriguez chose a case involving both the reach of the 
mandatory detention statute and a procedural aspect of those hearings, 
namely, the burden of proof.16 For this reason, this Article is part-
icularly timely. 
 
13. Several courts of appeals, considering whether mandatory detention was 
constitutional, determined that it violated Due Process. See, e.g., Welch v. 
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 224 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Fourteen months of 
incarceration pendente lite of a longtime resident alien with extensive 
community ties, with no chance of release and no speedy adjudication rights 
as in criminal proceedings, together lead us to conclude that the circum-
stances of Welch’s detention constitute punishment without trial.”); Hoang 
v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
mandatory detention of the defendant violated his due process right to an 
individual determination of flight risk and danger to the community); Kim 
v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 539 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Patel v. Zemski, 275 
F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (same). But see Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 
954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) by a lawful permanent resident). The Supreme Court disagreed 
and upheld mandatory detention against a Due Process challenge in 2003. 
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (“Detention during removal 
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”).  
14. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (holding that 
immigration judges must provide periodic hearings for detainees held more 
than twelve months); Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(holding that if a detainee is not released immediately from state custody 
into immigration custody, mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 
does not apply). 
15. For example, in the case of Lavrinenko v. Horgan, No. 1:14-CV-10799 (D. 
Mass. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 14-1627 (1st Cir. 2015), the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) litigated the adequacy of bond procedures. 
The case did not reach resolution in the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
because the client was released on bond. See Immigration Detention, ACLU 
Massachusetts, https://aclum.org/our-work/aclum-issues/ 
immigrants-rights/immigration-detention/ [https://perma.cc/S4HG-BSFP] 
(discussing the ACLU’s involvement in Lavrinenko and similar cases). In 
another case, the ACLU is litigating the burden of proof in “Joseph” 
hearings, where a detainee must prove that the government is substantially 
unlikely to prevail on its mandatory detention charge. See Complaint at 18–
19, Gayle v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-02806-FLW, 2013 WL 1090993 (2013) 
(challenging the “standard and procedures for determining whether an 
individual in removal proceedings is subject to mandatory detention”); see 
also Gayle v. Johnson, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 404–05 (D.N.J. 2015) (deciding 
summary judgement claims). 
16. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9.  
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains how the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (Board) originally held that there should be a 
presumption of liberty, and that the government must prove 
dangerousness and flight risk to justify detention. Only for certain 
categories of removable noncitizens, such as those removable for certain 
criminal convictions and terrorism, did Congress write in a legislative 
presumption against liberty, explicitly placing the burden of proof on 
the detainee. In 1997, however, the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) wrote a regulation placing the burden on 
the detainee in initial custody determinations made by the INS (this 
decision is now made by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Agency (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)). In 
1999, the Board extended the burden-shifting of this regulation to bond 
hearings, where an immigration judge reviews that initial custody 
determination. In Part II, I briefly describe other areas of civil 
detention, where, in order to survive a Due Process challenge, the 
burden of proof must be on the government. Part II also discusses key 
immigration detention cases decided by the Supreme Court to 
demonstrate that there is nothing special about immigration detention 
to justify a detainee-borne burden of proof. In Part III, I examine the 
misaligned burdens of proof and argue that if the government must 
prove removability by clear and convincing evidence, then the 
government also must prove a need to detain during that removal 
process. I apply theories of why burdens of proof exist in the law to 
argue that in bond hearings, the government must bear the burden by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
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I. An Unsupported Burden Shift 
Historically, the statutes authorizing immigration detention did not 
clarify who bore the burden of proof.17 Neither did the regulations im-
plementing these statutes.18 In 1976, the Board filled in the statutory 
 
17. The Internal Security Act of 1950 contained the following language: 
Pending final determination of the deportability of any alien taken into 
custody under warrant of the Attorney General, such alien may, in the 
discretion of the Attorney General (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be 
released under bond in the amount of not less than $500, with security 
approved by the Attorney General; or (3) be released on conditional parole. 
Pub. L. No. 831, § 23(a), 64 Stat. 1010, 1011 (1950). When Congress passed 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the provision governing 
detention was former 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which provided: 
Pending a determination of deportability in the case of any alien as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section, such alien may, upon warrant 
of the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into custody. Any such 
alien taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney General 
and pending such final determination of deportability, (1) be continued in 
custody; or (2) be released under bond in the amount of not less than $500 
with security approved by the Attorney General, containing such 
conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (3) be released on 
conditional parole. 
Pub. L. No. 414, § 242(a), 66 Stat. 208, 208–09 (1952). 
18. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1958) (authorizing the district director to 
“detain an alien in, or release him from, custody”). In 1963, the INS amended 
the regulation to adopt language that is substantially similar to the 
regulation governing immigration judges today: “a district 
director . . . may exercise the authority contained in section 242 of the Act 
to continue or detain an alien in, or release him from, custody, to determine 
whether an alien shall be released under bond, and the amount thereof, if 
any . . . .” Orders to Show Cause and Warrants of Arrest, 28 Fed. Reg. 8279, 
8280 (Aug. 13, 1963) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242). In 1969, the regulation 
was further amended to authorize the special inquiry officer—the predecessor 
to the immigration judge—to review custody determinations made by the 
district director. See Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 526 (B.I.A. 1973) 
(reviewing regulatory history). The new regulation similarly provided that 
both the District Director and special inquiry officer “may exercise the 
authority contained in section 242 of the Act to continue or detain a 
respondent in, or release him from, custody, and to determine whether a 
respondent shall be released under bond, and the amount thereof, if any.” 8 
C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1970). Subsequently, after the position of special inquiry 
officer was replaced by the immigration judge in 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 8590 
(Apr. 4, 1973), the regulations were amended to transfer the same authority 
over custody determinations to the immigration judge. The new regulation 
authorized the district director to determine whether a noncitizen “is to be 
continued in custody” or released on bond or conditions of supervision, 8 
C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1983), and further provided for immigration judge review 
of that determination: 
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void, deciding In re Patel,19 which established a presumption against 
detention. The Board wrote, “[a]n alien generally is not and should not 
be detained or required to post bond except on a finding that he is a 
threat to the national security . . . or that he is a poor bail risk.”20 The 
Board reaffirmed this presumption in numerous cases.21 Although the 
Board in Patel was not long on analysis when it set forth its 
presumption of freedom in bond determinations, one can certainly see 
the constitutional backdrop to the presumption of freedom.22 Earlier 
Board decisions that dealt with detention once a noncitizen had been 
ordered deported provided stronger Due Process rhetoric behind a 
presumption of freedom.23 
 
After an initial determination [by the INS District Director], and at any 
time before a deportation order becomes administratively final . . . an 
immigration judge may exercise the authority contained in section 242 of 
the Act to continue or detain a respondent in, or release him from custody, 
and to determine whether a respondent shall be released under bond, and 
the amount thereof, if any. 
 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1983). 
19. 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1976). 
20. Id. at 666 (citation omitted). 
21. See, e.g., Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 489 (B.I.A. 1987) (reaffirming the 
holding in Patel); Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979) (same); 
Spiliopoulos, 16 I. & N. Dec. 561, 563 (B.I.A. 1978) (same). 
22. See infra Part II (analyzing civil detention cases). 
23. See, e.g., Kwun, 13 I. & N. Dec. 457, 464 (B.I.A. 1969) (“In our system of 
ordered liberty, the freedom of the individual is considered precious. No 
deportable alien should be deprived of his liberty pending execution of the 
deportation order unless there are compelling reasons and every effort should 
be made to keep the period of any necessary detention at a minimum.”); Au, 
13 I. & N. Dec. 133, 137–38 (B.I.A. 1968) (“The statute makes it clear that 
the detention power was designed for use, where needed, to make the alien 
available for hearing and, if ordered, for deportation. Denial of bail has been 
sustained by the courts only where it has been demonstrated that the alien is 
not a good risk security-wise . . . or bail-wise.” (citation omitted)).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings 
83 
A. Burdens of Proof for the “Presumptively Unbailable” Detainees 
In a series of amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA),24 Congress created what I call “presumptively unbailable” de-
tainees.25 The early mandatory detention statutes were the first 
provisions of the INA to address the burden of proof for custody pur-
poses. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created a new concept—the 
“aggravated felony,” then defined to include only murder, drug 
trafficking, and firearms trafficking—and carved out special provisions 
mandating the detention of any alien who had been convicted of such 
an offense.26 By using the term “aggravated felony,” which, according 
to one Board member, “manages to mislead, to alarm, to distort, and 
to dehumanize,”27 Congress set the stage for presuming all such persons 
to be dangerous.28 Because Congress also made “aggravated felony” a 
ground for deportation, it set the stage for presuming flight risks of 
these noncitizens (because a noncitizen who was certainly deportable 
was less likely to appear for a hearing).29  
24. For an excellent discussion of the history of how and why Congress adopted 
these various statutes, see Margaret Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial 
Deference to Congressional Folly, in Immigration Stories 344 (David A. 
Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., Foundation Press 2005). César Cuauhtémoc 
García Hernández also has chronicled the legislative history of immigration 
detention, demonstrating how the war on drugs and the war on crime 
infiltrated the immigration detention policies of the 1980s and 1990s. García 
Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, supra note 10. 
25. Mark Noferi has discussed a related “noncitizen presumption,” which refers 
to the presumption that noncitizens who committed certain crimes are more 
dangerous than citizen detainees. See Mark Noferi, Mandatory Immigration 
Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption of Dangerousness, 
in Immigration Detention, Risk and Human Rights: Studies on 
Immigration and Crime 217 (Maria João Guia, Robert Koulish & 
Valsamis Mitsilegas eds., 2016). He explains that this presumption exists 
for expressive, not empirical reasons; namely, “blaming the gatekeeper”—
responding to the public’s belief that immigration officials have failed their 
gatekeeping function—and that the “U.S. socially constructs noncitizens as 
‘invitees’ per a property law analogy,” so there is categorically no tolerance 
of immigrants’ crimes. Id. at 218. 
26. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343, 102 Stat. 4470 
(1988) (adding a new INA § 242(a)(2) providing that the Attorney General 
must take into custody aliens convicted of an aggravated felony upon 
completion of the sentence and “shall not release such felon from custody”). 
27. De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 359 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board 
Member, dissenting). 
28. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (describing a 1986 study that showed 
“criminal aliens” were more likely to commit more crimes before being 
removed). 
29. See id. at 521 (citing to studies presented to Congress that “criminal aliens” 
were less likely to appear for their hearings). In 1996, Congress made relief 
for long-term residents convicted of an aggravated felony impossible. See INS 
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In 1990, Congress changed the law to direct the Attorney General 
to release lawful permanent residents (LPRs) upon determining “that 
the alien is not a threat to the community and that the alien is likely 
to appear before any scheduled hearings.”30 Although the statutory text 
was silent on the issue, the Board read this provision to establish a 
presumption against the release of such a noncitizen, unless he rebutted 
this presumption by showing his eligibility for release.31 The Board 
reasoned that it would be “unreasonable to conclude that the statute 
requires the Service to take into custody an alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony, and then requires the Service to attempt to demon-
strate that the alien ‘is not’ a threat to the community and ‘is likely’ 
to appear for any scheduled hearings.”32 
A further amendment in 1991 expanded the category of persons 
entitled to individual review to include any alien who had been lawfully 
admitted—whether temporarily or permanently—thus leaving only 
entrants without inspection subject to the detention mandate. The 
 
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–97 (2001) (chronicling the history of relief under 
former INA § 212(c)); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (stating that cancellation of 
removal for lawful permanent residents is not available if convicted of 
aggravated felony). 
30. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5049 
(amending former INA § 242(a)(2)). Although one can say Congress changed 
the law to respond to the district courts’ findings that it was unconstitutional 
as applied to LPRs—see, e.g., Kellman v. Dist. Dir., 750 F. Supp. 625, 628 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding as unconstitutional the INA provision denying the 
defendant a meaningful bail determination); Probert v. INS, 750 F. Supp. 
252, 257 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (same); Paxton v. INS, 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (same); Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 509–10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Agunobi v. Thornburgh, 745 F. Supp. 533, 537 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (same)—in reality this change was introduced to permit 
Robert Probert, a Canadian hockey player for the Detroit Red Wings, to be 
released on bond during his deportation proceedings notwithstanding his 
cocaine conviction. Taylor, supra note 24, at 350; id. at 371 n.42 (citing Bail 
Hearing for Robert Probert?, Toronto Star F2 (Nov. 20, 1991)) (noting 
that the amendment was “sought on Probert’s behalf” by Michigan 
representative John Conyers)).  
31. See De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 350 (B.I.A. 1991) (“We find that the 
statutory scheme and language of section 242(a)(2) creates a presumption 
against the release of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony from 
Service custody unless the alien demonstrates that he is an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, is not a threat to the community, and is 
likely to appear for any scheduled hearings.”). 
32. Id. (emphasis in original). Board member Heilman strongly disagreed with 
this reading of the legislative history. Drawing on the legislative history and 
judicial interpretations of the nearly identical language in the federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1984, he believed that while the detainee could bear the 
initial burden of production, the burden of persuasion should rest with the 
government. Id. at 352–60 (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting). 
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amended provision also clearly put the burden of proof on the non-
citizen to establish his eligibility for release.33 Thus, the statute imposed 
a presumption in favor of detention for aggravated felons and assigned 
the burden of proof to the noncitizen to show eligibility for release in 
the case of a lawfully admitted noncitizen facing removal due to an 
aggravated felony conviction. The custody hearings of all other 
noncitizens were governed by the rule in Matter of Patel.34 
In 1996, Congress passed a major overhaul to the immigration 
statute with a pair of laws—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA)35 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).36 Both of these laws contained 
provisions related to immigration detention. With AEDPA, Congress 
eliminated the Attorney General’s authority to release from detention 
most noncitizens charged with criminal grounds of removal.37 However, 
later that year, Congress, realizing that there would not be enough 
 
33. See Ellis, 20 I & N Dec. 641, 643 n.2 (B.I.A. 1993) (noting that 1991 
amendments clarified the burden of proof issue). Thus, § 1252(a)(2)(B) 
provided that: 
The Attorney General may not release from custody any lawfully 
admitted alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony, either 
before or after a determination of deportability, unless the alien 
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that such alien 
is not a threat to the community and that the alien is likely to appear 
before any scheduled hearings. 
Former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (1994), amended by Miscellaneous and 
Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-232, § 306(a)(4), 105 Stat. 1733, 1751.  
34. See Valdez-Valdez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 703, 706 (B.I.A. 1997) (“Prior to April 
1996, custody determinations for aliens deportable on nonaggravated felony 
grounds were governed by the general bond provisions found in section 
242(a)(1) of the Act, under which it was presumed that an alien would not be 
detained or required to post bond unless there was a finding that the alien is 
a threat to the national security or a poor bail risk.” (citing Patel, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 1976))); Ellis, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 642 (explaining that “[i]n 
standard bond proceedings . . . an alien, whom the Service in its discretion has 
arrested and taken into custody, generally should not be detained or required 
to post bond pending a determination of deportability except on a finding that 
he is a threat to the national security or is a poor bail risk,” but that bond 
redetermination requests by “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony” are 
governed by former INA § 242(a)(2) (citing Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 
1976))); De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 349–50 (same). 
35. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
36. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).  
37. AEDPA § 440(c). 
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detention beds for all of those now subject to mandatory detention,38 in 
IIRIRA temporarily restored some discretionary authority to the 
Attorney General to release such noncitizens under the Transition 
Period Custody Rules during the period those rules were in effect.39 
Much like the 1990 and 1991 amendments to the detention statute, the 
Transition Period Custody Rules provided that the Attorney General 
could release a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention “only if” he 
was convicted of an aggravated felony or deportable on certain 
enumerated criminal grounds, and placed the burden on the noncitizen 
to prove that he was not a danger or a flight risk.40 
With IIRIRA, Congress passed the permanent “mandatory de-
tention” statute that exists today, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).41 Those who are 
removable for several criminal offenses—aggravated felonies, crimes 
involving moral turpitude, firearms offenses, and drug crimes, among 
others—are now ineligible for an individual consideration of their dan-
gerousness and flight risk.42 While the moniker “mandatory detention” 
is certainly a true and accurate description of the harshness of this 
statute, that label is not technically correct. There is one possible way 
for an immigration judge to release a detainee even if he fits within the 
enumerated grounds of removability; that is if the Attorney General 
decides that release from custody is necessary for witness protection43  
38. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 353 (noting that Congress had failed to realize 
“that the INS simply did not have sufficient bed space to carry out the new 
detention mandate”). 
39. See IIRIRA § 303(b)(3) (providing guidelines for when the Attorney 
General could release noncitizens). 
40. The language of the Transition Period Custody Rules read that the Attorney 
General could release a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention only if: 
(i) the alien was lawfully admitted to the United States and satisfies the 
Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of 
other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled 
proceeding, or 
(ii) the alien was not lawfully admitted to the United States, cannot be 
removed because the designated country of removal will not accept the 
alien, and satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a 
danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear 
for any scheduled proceeding. 
 IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(B). 
41. See IIRIRA § 303(a) (providing for mandatory detention). 
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (requiring that the Attorney General take any 
alien who commits an aggravated felony, a crime of moral turpitude, a 
firearms offense, a drug crime, or another enumerated crime into custody). 
43. The Attorney General must decide, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3521, “that 
release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a 
witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into 
major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate 
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“and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose 
a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to 
appear for any scheduled proceeding.”44 Like the 1990 and 1991 statutes 
and the Transition Period Custody Rules, Congress, when legislating 
about the presumptive poor bail risk of a class of detainees, expressly 
placed the burden of proof for the (albeit limited) class of those who 
could get a bond hearing. 
AEDPA also included detention provisions for the Alien Terrorist 
Removal Court, in which noncitizens can be removed on national se-
curity grounds. Following the pattern begun in the 1990 statute, these 
provisions allow for some detainees to seek release, but place the burden 
on them to prove they are not a danger or a flight risk.45 
The brief statutory history of the “presumptively unbailable” de-
tainees has demonstrated how Congress knowingly placed the burden 
of proof in bond hearings only on certain categories of detainees. To 
clarify, I do not endorse the label I am assigning to these detainees; I 
agree with many scholars that a conviction for one of these crimes does 
not actually render someone dangerous.46 I also agree that we should 
 
of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an 
investigation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012). 
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012). 
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) provides: 
(2) Special rules for permanent resident aliens 
(A) Release hearing 
An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence shall be entitled to a 
release hearing before the judge assigned to hear the removal hearing. 
Such an alien shall be detained pending the removal hearing, unless the 
alien demonstrates to the court that the alien- 
(i) is a person lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United 
States; 
(ii) if released upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe 
(including the posting of any monetary amount), is not likely to flee; and 
(iii) will not endanger national security, or the safety of any person or 
the community, if released. 
 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).  
46. See, e.g., Noferi, supra note 25, at 233 (“[A] criminal conviction is not 
necessarily a ‘reliable indicator’ of dangerousness—particularly minor 
convictions, many of which trigger mandatory immigration detention.”). 
There is also significant debate about whether a judge can even predict 
dangerousness. See, e.g., David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive 
Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 696 (2009) 
(“[P]reventive detention rests on a prediction about future behavior, and no 
one can predict the future. Decision makers all too often fall back on 
stereotypes and prejudices as proxies for dangerousness. Humility about our 
predictive abilities should counsel against preventive detention.”). Scholars 
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not be presuming dangerousness about anyone based on a legislative 
category of their crime without an individualized determination of the 
facts of their case.47 I further agree that the term “aggravated felony” 
has grown into a “colossus,”48 so presuming dangerousness about anyone 
who has an aggravated felony conviction is highly problematic. What 
is worse, now the “presumptively unbailable” category is not even 
limited to those convicted of an aggravated felony.49 These expansions 
leave one to wonder how narrowly-drafted the mandatory detention 
 
have argued that, while predictions of future dangerousness are rampant in 
criminal law, “generations of scientists have explained that such predictions 
cannot meet the standards of science.” Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-
Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for 
Violence?, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 301, 308 (2006). 
47. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 24, at 344 (noting that requiring an individual 
determination of dangerous before detention has been applied by the 
Supreme Court in other contexts); Cole, supra note 46, at 717 (“The Court’s 
reasoning in Kim is flawed, as it proffers no good reason for discarding the 
requirement of individualized need before subjecting a human being to 
preventive detention.”). 
48. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 
484 (2007) (describing the amended definition of aggravated felony as a 
“colossus” after “a series of amendments have added crime after crime to the 
list”). Amendments since 1988 have added “crimes of violence,” theft, receipt 
of stolen property, fraud, forgery, and obstruction of justice, to name a few 
offenses that now meet the twenty-one part definition. See e.g., Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 
§ 4(b)(5), 117 Stat. 2875, 2879 (2003) (adding peonage, slavery, involuntary 
servitude, and trafficking in persons); IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–627 (1996) (adding sexual abuse of 
a minor and rape); AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 
1277–78 (1996) (adding bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, certain gambling 
offenses, vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of a 
witness); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4321–22 (1994) (adding theft, 
receipt of stolen property, burglary, trafficking in fraudulent documents, 
RICO, certain prostitution offenses, fraud or deceit, tax evasion, and human 
smuggling); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 
Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990) (adding “crimes of violence”). With IIRIRA in 1996, 
Congress also reduced the length of sentence necessary to trigger the 
aggravated felony definition from five years to one year, IIRIRA, § 
321(a)(3)–(4), 110 Stat. at 3009–627, while at the same time redefining a 
sentence to include any suspended sentence. Id. at § 322(a)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 
at 3009–628.  
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (mandatory detention for those removable for 
multiple convictions, convictions of an aggravated felony, convictions of drug 
offenses, firearms offenses, crimes of moral turpitude with a sentence of more 
than one year, convictions of involvement with terrorism, and convictions on 
other miscellaneous crimes). 
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statute really is,50 especially when one compares it to the federal Bail 
Reform Act, which one court described as “a narrowly-drafted statute 
with the pretrial detention provision addressed to the danger from a 
small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants.”51 
Leaving those issues aside for the moment, what appears to be true 
is that Congress saw those detainees as a danger and/or flight risk and 
legislatively placed the burden of proof on them to prove otherwise. Not 
all detainees, however, fit within a “presumptively unbailable” 
category—many of those detained have been convicted of no crime,52 
or, if they have been convicted, their offenses do not fit within a 
“presumptively unbailable” category. How does the burden allocation 
operate for those detainees? 
 
50. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 558 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Detention [under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)] is not limited 
to dangerous criminal aliens or those found likely to flee, but applies to all 
aliens claimed to be deportable for criminal convictions, even where the 
underlying offenses are minor.”). But see id. at 526 (majority opinion) 
(describing the detention policy in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) as “narrow”). 
51. United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation and 
internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
747 (1987) (“The Bail Reform Act [BRA] carefully limits the circumstances 
under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes.”). Of 
course, amendments to the BRA have operated to expand those that 
Congress initially deemed to be that “small but identifiable group of 
particularly dangerous defendants.” Himler, 797 F.2d at 160 (citation 
omitted). For example, while the original drafting of the BRA in 1984 allowed 
for a presumption of dangerousness in cases of drug trafficking, crimes of 
violence, offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or death, or 
certain repeat offenders, today, offenses involving drug trafficking, terrorism, 
carrying a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and offenses 
involving minor victims (from sexual abuse to offenses involving child 
pornography) all create the rebuttable presumption of dangerousness. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (providing conditions for the rebuttable presumption). 
Nonetheless, the BRA appears to have been much more carefully drafted, 
against the backdrop of much discussion around the constitutionality of its 
provisions, than the mandatory detention provisions. See Taylor, supra note 
24, at 348–54 (detailing the legislative history leading up to the passage of 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(c) and stating, “[i]n sum, Congress did not enact the statute 
that mandated detention without bond for Hyung Joon Kim and other non-
citizen offenders with anything close to the careful consideration depicted in 
the Demore decision”). 
52. See, e.g., Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 794–95 (B.I.A. 2016) (upholding 
immigration judge’s denial of bond based on dangerousness for a detainee 
who had no criminal record, but who used a suspicious passport); Guerra, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 41 (B.I.A. 2006) (upholding immigration judge’s denial 
of bond for a detainee who had been charged with drug trafficking, but had 
not been convicted). 
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B. Burdens of Proof for the Non “Presumptively Unbailable” Detainees 
As a follow-up to the 1996 laws, when the will to detain as many 
noncitizens as possible was at its highest,53 the former INS engaged in 
rulemaking to flip the presumption of freedom for its initial custody 
determinations for all detainees—not just the “presumptively un-
bailable.”54 The INS acknowledged the change, but explained the rule 
change in the following terms: 
Several commenters stated that § 236 of the proposed rule as 
written is a reversal of long established procedure that provides 
that a noncriminal alien is presumptively eligible for release. The 
Service has been strongly criticized for its failure to remove aliens 
who are not detained. A recent report by the Department of 
Justice Inspector General shows that when aliens are released 
from custody, nearly 90 percent abscond and are not removed 
from the United States. The mandate of Congress, as evidenced 
by budget enhancements and other legislation, is increased de-
tention to ensure removal. Accordingly, because the Service be-
lieves that the regulation as written is consistent with the intent 
of Congress, the interim rule has not modified the proposed rule 
in this regard.55 
There are several flaws in the INS’s explanation for the rule 
change.56 The supposed consistency with a Congressional “mandate” is 
 
53. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 346–54 (detailing political backdrop to 
mandatory detention statute); see also Gilman, supra note 3, at 14 (“When 
mandatory detention became the law for certain groups of migrants, custody 
determination proceedings for release-eligible migrants changed their character 
as well. Essentially, all migrants were assimilated to criminal subjects for 
detention purposes, including those who had no criminal history at all . . . .”). 
54. The substance of § 1236.1(c)(8) was first proposed in January 1997, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 444, 484 (Jan. 3, 1997), and promulgated as 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(2) 
(1998) that March. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,360 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim rule). 
Paragraph (c)(2) was re-designated as (c)(8) in the final rule released in May 
1998. 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,449 (May 19, 1998). The final regulation reads: 
Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s 
discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, 
under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided 
that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that 
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that 
the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding. 
 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(2) (1998). 
55. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997). 
56. For example, the Inspector General report that the INS cites does not even 
address the detention of noncitizens in removal proceedings, but rather 
discusses the detention and deportation of noncitizens with final orders of 
removal, who present an entirely different level of flight risk as a result. 
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questionable. To the extent the INS’s reference to “other legislation” 
refers to IIRIRA and AEDPA, those statutes created mandatory deten-
tion without a possibility of release for new categories of “presumptively 
unbailable” detainees, but changed nothing about the detention scheme 
for all other detainees (apart from raising the minimum bond from $500 
to $1,500).57 If anything, the sweeping changes that IIRIRA and 
AEDPA made to detain more “presumptively unbailable” detainees 
without a bond hearing, coupled with Congress’ simultaneous decision 
to leave the scheme for all other detainees essentially intact, suggest 
that Congress intended to leave Patel’s presumption against detention 
in place.58 It is also unclear why the mere fact of “budget enhancements” 
and increased detention bed space would demonstrate Congress’ intent 
to depart from the longstanding presumption against detention at bond 
hearings for those who are not “presumptively unbailable.” The more 
likely explanation is that the budget enhancements were simply 
intended to accommodate the agency’s new and expanded detention 
mandates, and particularly its obligations under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the 
new mandatory detention statute. Also quite troubling is the lack of 
any constitutional analysis. The INS treated the presumption of 
freedom as one of those agency policy choices that can be changed on 
a whim (or, to withstand an arbitrary and capricious challenge, with 
some explanation of its shift in policy).59 
 
Thus, the Inspector General found upon review of “656 case files for aliens 
who were not detained when final deportation orders were issued to them,” 
only “72 aliens (11 percent) left the country; 45 were formally deported and 
27 others left the country of their own accord.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Rep. No. I-96-03, Deportation of Aliens After Final Orders 
Have Been Issued, (1996), http://www.justice.gov 
/oig/reports/INS/e9603/#REMOVAL%20OF%20NON [https://perma.cc/ 
E2E6-EHN8]. What is probably a better explanation of INS’s intense focus 
on this report is that the exposure of this report to the press revealed an 
embarrassing statistic about the INS’s “near total inability to remove 
deportable criminal aliens.” Taylor, supra note 24, at 347, 351 (citing Demore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003)). 
57. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) with former 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1995) (both 
statutes allow the Attorney General to release an alien under bond and to 
prescribe the conditions of the bond, but the 1995 statute requires that the 
minimum bond be no less than $500 and the 2012 statute requires the 
minimum bond be no less than $1,500). 
58. This would be consistent with the Board’s holdings in several cases. See 
cases cited supra note 34. 
59. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) 
(“[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its 
action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing 
position . . . . And of course the agency must show that there are good 
reasons for the new policy.”). 
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The Board, of course, could have engaged in a constitutional an-
alysis when it considered what the burden of proof should be in  
discretionary bond hearings.60 However, in Adeniji,61 the Board held 
that when an immigration judge reconsiders the government’s initial 
decision to detain pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the burden of proof 
is on the detainee.62 The Board’s primary support for this allocation of 
the burden came from the 1997 regulation promulgated by the INS that 
is described above.63 The Board fully acknowledged that this regulation 
did not apply to immigration judges, but only to initial custody 
determinations made by the then-INS.64 However, the Board stated that 
this regulation “is binding on us and pertains directly to removal 
proceedings under the IIRIRA.”65 That the Board—situated within 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, the adjudicative body—
would find itself governed by the enforcement agency’s agenda is 
troubling, especially when that same enforcement agency had once be-
come so maddened with immigration judges reducing their bonds that 
they plotted to remove all immigration judge review of their officers’ 
detention decisions.66 This blind following of the INS’s poorly-reasoned 
 
60. Although it is correct that the Board, as an administrative agency, cannot 
engage in constitutional analysis, in fact the Board does engage in such 
analysis in order to avoid an unconstitutional reading of a statute or a 
regulation. See, e.g., Valdez-Valdez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 703, 710–14 (B.I.A. 
1997) (using Supreme Court Due Process retroactivity analysis to determine 
which statute applies to a subset of detainees); see also Adeniji, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 1102, 1123 (B.I.A. 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting) 
(“While the Board may not decide the constitutionality of a statute, we do 
have the duty to render our decisions in a manner that will avoid 
constitutional questions.”). Indeed, Board member Heilman, arguing that 
the Board should read the 1990 version of the mandatory detention statute 
to include a presumption of release, did not specifically reference the 
constitution, but wrote that the “‘aggravated felony’ bond provision is 
almost embarrassing in its indifference to the most elementary considerations 
which have been traditionally associated with detention in American law.” 
De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 359 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board Member, 
dissenting); see also id. at 356 (“[T]here is every reason to find that section 
242(a)(2)(B) of the Act should be interpreted as applying the general 
American presumption in favor of release, pending trial, or as in the 
immigration context, pending a deportation hearing.”). 
61. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102 (B.I.A. 1999). 
62. Id. at 1113. 
63. See id. at 1112 (referring to 8 C.FR. § 236.1(c)(8)). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1113. 
66. INS General Counsel told the attendees at the American Immigration 
Lawyers Association Annual Conference in 1985 that his personal agenda 
was to eliminate all bond appeals to immigration judges, leaving bond 
decisions exclusively to the discretion of district court judges. Janet A. 
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regulation would be akin to a magistrate judge, in a criminal bail 
hearing, deciding she had to follow the police’s policies about who to 
detain.67 
The Board justified following this regulation’s allocation of the bur-
den of proof because it reflected the test set forth in Drysdale—a case 
that interpreted the 1991 statute for “presumptively unbailable” de-
tainees.68 Perhaps this was a reasonable fix for Mr. Adeniji, who would 
have been covered by one of the “presumptively unbailable” detention 
statutes had they been worded differently.69 Perhaps this is why his 
lawyer conceded that the burden should be on him, and that the test 
 
Gilboy, Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values, 13 Law 
& Soc. Inquiry 515, 541–42 (1988) (citing Speech by Maurice C. Inman, 
Jr., General Counsel, INS, 1985 American Immigration Lawyers Association 
Annual Conference, June 4–9, 1985, Boston, Mass. (Cassette #10, Recent 
Developments at the Justice Department, Convention Seminar Cassettes, 
250 Royal Ave., Simi Valley, Cal.)). “About a half a year later, a new 
[proposed] rule aimed at limiting [IJ] and [Board] bail authority [over bond] 
appeared as part of the Department of Justice’s Semi-annual Regulatory 
Agenda. The rule proposed that release without bond would be authorized 
only by the INS [and not the IJ or Board]. This rule was never published for 
comment.” Id. at 542 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 44,296 (1985)) (citations omitted). 
To be sure, not all employees of INS were in favor of harsher detention. For 
example, several former INS employees signed an amicus brief in Demore v. 
Kim, supporting Mr. Kim in his argument that mandatory detention 
violated Due Process. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 343 (noting that the INS 
officials viewed mandatory detention as “unfair and inefficient”). 
67. See De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 359–60 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board 
Member, dissenting) (“Unlike the criminal justice system, the initial decision 
to jail a person is made by the very law enforcement agency which ordered 
the arrest. There is no impartial magistrate or judge involved at that stage. 
The hearing before the immigration judge offers the first opportunity for an 
alien to appear before an impartial trier of fact.”). 
68. Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (B.I.A. 1999) (“This test is certainly akin 
to the ‘threat to the community’ test contained in [Drysdale] which the 
parties agree should apply in the case of this respondent.”); Drysdale, 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 815, 815 (B.I.A. 1994) (providing “a presumption against the 
release . . . of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony” unless he meets 
certain conditions). 
69. Due to the fact that he had been released prior to October 8, 1998, the 
current version of the statute—mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)—did not apply to him. Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1122. Yet, 
because of the notoriously poorly-worded INA, neither did the Transition 
Period Custody Rules (the rules that were intended to govern until the INS 
acquired enough bed space for all of those subject to mandatory detention). 
See id. at 1110–11 (“We have doubts whether Congress intended [a savings 
clause for the Transition Rules] at all, let alone what its precise terms might 
have been.”). Since he fell through the cracks of a shifting legal landscape, 
the Board had no choice but to apply the discretionary detention statute, 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), to his case. 
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should be the Drysdale test.70 But to apply the test that governed the 
“presumptively unbailable” to those who had always been presumed 
free was a grave byproduct of the Adeniji decision.71 Following prior 
cases, the Board could have decided that all non-“presumptively 
unbailable” detainees would have their bond hearings governed by 
Matter of Patel’s presumption of freedom,72 which would have limited 
Adeniji’s holding to its facts. Yet the Board repeatedly reaffirmed that 
the burden of proof is on the detainee in bond hearings before the 
immigration judge.73 Now it has become such an ingrained part of 
immigration detention law that one can easily forget that a presumption 
of freedom ever existed. 
The principle of Chevron deference74 would suggest that the Board, 
faced with an arguably unclear statute, has spoken, and thus courts 
should defer to it. From an administrative law standpoint, however, 
Adeniji is problematic because the Board did not even mention Patel’s 
longstanding presumption against detention, much less explain the 
 
70. Mr. Adeniji’s lawyer, the late Michael Maggio, was a famous immigration 
attorney, known for his zealous advocacy. Although I do not know for sure, I 
can speculate that he conceded to the burden of proof issue in order to get 
DHS to concede that mandatory detention did not apply to him. After all, 
getting a bond hearing where your client must bear the burden of proof is a 
significant win when compared to getting no bond hearing. See Gilman, supra 
note 3, at 13 (“Scholars and advocates alike have condoned bond proceedings 
in juxtaposition to the much-maligned mandatory detention framework.”). 
71. Board Member Lory Rosenberg, dissenting in Adeniji, did not appear to have 
foreseen that the Board would later apply its reasoning to all 1226(a) 
detainees. See Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1125 (Rosenberg, Board Member, 
dissenting) (“As I read the majority opinion, the Board now requires a 
respondent who has been convicted of a criminal offense or other prohibited 
activity contrary to national security interests, but who is not subject to 
mandatory detention, to establish that he or she does not pose a danger to 
persons or property and is not likely to abscond.”). But see Guerra, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006) (holding that, in a case where the detainee was 
not convicted of any crime, “[t]he burden is on the alien to show to the 
satisfaction of the Immigration Judge that he or she merits release on bond”). 
72. See cases cited supra note 34. 
73. See, e.g., Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 795 n.3 (B.I.A. 2016) (“We have 
consistently held that aliens have the burden to establish eligibility for bond 
while proceedings are pending.”); Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (B.I.A. 
2009) (“The alien bears the burden of proving that his release would not pose 
a danger to property or persons.”); Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 38 (“An 
alien . . . must establish . . . that he or she does not present a danger to 
persons or property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not pose 
a risk of flight.”); D-J, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 (A.G. 2003) (“[R]espondent 
has failed to demonstrate adequately that he does not present a risk of 
flight . . . .”). 
74. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984). 
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shift.75 From a constitutional law standpoint, the Board’s decision 
violates what one Board member has described as “the general 
American presumption in favor of release, pending trial, or as in the 
immigration context, pending a deportation hearing.”76 This general 
American presumption against detention is discussed in the next Part. 
II. Due Process and the Burden of Proof  
in Civil Detention 
Since the immigration authorities began detaining noncitizens 
during the deportation or exclusion process, there have been challenges 
to the legality of such detention.77 The Supreme Court has never con-
sidered immigration detention to be punitive incarceration.78 Rather, 
immigration detention has always been deemed “civil,” mostly because 
it is embedded within a process—deportation—that itself has never 
been considered to be punishment.79 Should immigration detention be  
75. This would be a classic arbitrary and capricious agency decision, since the 
agency can change its mind, but must explain why it is doing so. See FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he 
requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action 
would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing 
position. An agency may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub 
silentio . . . . And of course the agency must show that there are good 
reasons for the new policy.”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“Unexplained inconsistency 
is . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and 
capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.”). 
76. De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 356 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board 
Member, dissenting). 
77. See generally Daniel Wilsher, Immigration Detention: Law, History, 
Politics 19 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (noting that Chinese immigrants 
used the federal courts to attempt to block new federal legislation); Lucy E. 
Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping 
of Modern Immigration Law 37 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1995) 
(same). 
78. In his article entitled Immigration Detention as Punishment, César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández makes a compelling argument against this 
doctrine. See generally García Hernández, supra note 10 (challenging, 
specifically, the assumption that immigration detention is a form of civil 
confinement). 
79. See id. at 1351–52 (discussing the Supreme Court’s position); see also 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however 
severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than 
a criminal procedure.”). Several scholars have critiqued the doctrine that 
deportation is itself not punishment. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right 
to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction 
of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1464 (2011) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, seriously considered the basic 
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considered punishment, Due Process would require the procedural 
protections of a criminal trial to justify taking away a person’s liberty.80 
This section begins with a description of how the Supreme Court 
has treated Due Process challenges to civil detention. What appears to 
be true throughout the history of the Court’s civil detention juris-
prudence is that the Court always has required the government to bear 
the burden of proof. Thus, the Court has required that civil detention 
be the “exception,” not the norm.81 
A. Supreme Court on Burdens in Civil Detention 
When can the government take away a person’s liberty without a 
criminal conviction and the corresponding protections of a criminal 
trial? David Cole has outlined the Court’s jurisprudence on civil de-
tention, finding that all civil detention schemes that have withstood 
Due Process challenges82 fit into one of three categories: 1) the detainee 
is in either criminal or immigration proceedings and poses a danger or 
a flight risk; 2) the detainee is dangerous because of a harm-threatening 
mental illness that impairs his ability to control his dangerousness; or 
3) the detainee is an enemy alien during a declared war.83 As recognized 
by the Supreme Court, civil detention is an extraordinary form of 
government restraint and must be carefully limited.84 Where the Court 
 
analytical and normative questions raised by the civil/criminal dichotomy in 
the deportation context.”); Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New 
Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation 
Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 24 (2011) (noting the Court’s long-held precedent that deportation is 
not a criminal sanction); Beth Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of 
Juveniles Offenders as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2261, 2277 (2013) (characterizing the “doctrinal interpretation of deportation 
as non-punitive”). 
80. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (“[I]t would be 
plainly competent for Congress to declare the act of an alien in remaining 
unlawfully within the United States to be an offence, punishable by fine or 
imprisonment, if such offence were to be established by a judicial trial.”). 
81. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (allowing for 
pretrial detention in “carefully limited” circumstances). 
82. Cole notes that, “[w]hile preventive detention has most often been analyzed 
through the lens of due process, the Fourth Amendment also imposes limits 
on the practice.” Cole, supra note 46, at 712. He also writes that “[t]he 
Suspension Clause guarantees the availability of the most important 
practical safeguard against arbitrary detention: judicial review.” Id. at 714. 
83. Id. at 707–08; Cole, supra note 6, at 1012–13. 
84. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily 
restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
755 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or 
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 
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has reviewed the constitutional adequacy of civil detention and the 
proceedings leading to such detention, it has placed significant weight 
on the burden of proof assignment in determining whether Due Process 
has been violated. 
An illustrative example is the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in 
U.S. v. Salerno,85 which upheld as constitutional the federal Bail 
Reform Act’s preventive detention scheme.86 In upholding pretrial de-
tention based on dangerousness, the Court found important, among 
other procedural protections, that the government bore the burden of 
proving dangerousness.87 The Salerno Court held that due process 
allowed pretrial detention based on dangerousness because “the Gover-
nment proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee pre-
sents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the com-
munity . . . .”88 Also important to the Salerno Court was that Congress 
had drawn the statute narrowly, meaning that prosecutors could only 
justify pretrial detention based on dangerousness when certain crimes 
were charged. These crimes—crimes of violence, offenses for which the 
sentence is life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain 
repeat offenders—were ones that Congress studied and found to 
categorically indicate dangerousness.89 As the Court wrote, “Congress 
specifically found that these individuals are far more likely to be 
responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest.”90 Thus, 
not only did the government bear the burden of proof at these bail 
 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process protection.”). 
85. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
86. Id. at 752; see also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention 
in American Theory and Practice, 2 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 85, 124 (2011) 
(describing “the most notable feature of the 1984 Act” as “its creation of a 
preventive detention option based on danger to ‘any other person or the 
community’—something that had not existed previously”). 
87. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (“In a full-blown adversary hearing, the 
Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing 
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the 
community or any person.”). The Court found that the procedural 
protections available under the BRA “are specifically designed to further the 
accuracy of that determination.” Id. at 751. These procedures included the 
right to court-appointed counsel, present witness, cross-examine the 
government’s witnesses, written findings of fact, immediate appellate review, 
and the enumeration of several statutory factors that the judicial officer must 
consider. See id. at 751–52 (listing procedural safeguards).  
88. Id. at 751. 
89. Id. at 747, 750. 
90. Id. at 750 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6–7 (1983)). 
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hearings, but Congress already had done some work to narrow the pool 
of pretrial detainees to the ones it believed to be most dangerous. 
One can compare the outcome in Salerno with the Court’s 1992 
decision in Foucha v. Louisiana,91 where the Supreme Court held that 
a Louisiana statute allowing for continued confinement of the mentally 
ill after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity violated Due 
Process. Critical to the Court’s analysis was that “the statute places 
the burden on the detainee to prove that he is not dangerous.”92 The 
Court compared the Louisiana statute to the Bail Reform Act it ex-
amined in Salerno, and found that the Louisiana statute was not care-
fully limited in the same manner as the Bail Reform Act.93 Mr. Foucha 
was not entitled to an adversarial hearing where the government would 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous to the 
community.94 Although there was a hearing, the state had to prove 
nothing; indeed, the only evidence the state put forward was a 
description of his behavior while detained and a doctor’s inconclusive 
testimony that he would not “feel comfortable in certifying that he 
would not be a danger to himself or to other people.”95 This testimony, 
the Court held, was “not enough to defeat Foucha’s liberty interest 
under the Constitution in being freed from indefinite confinement in a 
mental facility.”96 With respect to his behavior while detained, the 
Court found that the state had not explained why it could not use the 
ordinary criminal process to deal with any criminal conduct.97 The 
Court’s decision in Foucha demonstrates how important the burden of 
proof allocation is in the Due Process analysis when the government 
seeks to detain someone without resorting to the criminal process. 
Although the procedural protections given by the Louisiana statute 
were similar to those in Salerno (right to a hearing, court-appointed 
counsel, and judicial review),98 the burden of proof allocation was 
different; this made all of the difference. 
Similarly, in its 1979 decision in Addington v. Texas,99 the Court 
held that the government, to justify civil commitment, must prove 
 
91. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
92. Id. at 81–82. 
93. Id. at 81. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 81–82. 
96. Id. at 82. 
97. Id. 
98. See id. at 106, 114 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing procedures 
available to Mr. Foucha). 
99. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
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mental illness and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.100 
The Court found that the preponderance of the evidence standard was 
insufficient to comport with Due Process because it was improper to 
ask “the individual . . . to share equally with society the risk of error 
when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than 
any possible harm to the state.”101 Because the stakes were so high—an 
individual’s loss of liberty—it was necessary to increase the burden of 
proof on the government in order to “impress the factfinder with the 
importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances 
that inappropriate commitments will be ordered.”102 The Addington 
decision, although dealing only with the appropriate standard of proof 
(neither party argued that the government should not bear the burden 
of proof), provides yet another example of how critical the burden of 
proof allocation is to the Due Process analysis when the government 
seeks to take away an individual’s liberty. 
B. Is There Something Special About Immigration Detention? 
The Court has justified detention’s role in facilitating removal,103 
but, as David Cole has noted, the Court always has treated immigration 
detention like other civil detention—requiring the government to justify 
detention because of dangerousness or flight risk.104 Even in the face of 
the plenary power, which gives the political branches ultimate authority 
over whom to exclude and detain without intervention by the 
 
100. Id. at 427, 433. 
101. Id. at 427. 
102. Id. 
103. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (noting that aliens awaiting 
deportation proceedings have the opportunity to hurt the United States); 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (finding difficulty in 
carrying out deportation proceedings without the ability to hold the alien). 
104. Cole, supra note 6, at 1011–21; see also Cole, supra note 46, at 717–18 (noting 
that while the Court has not ruled out preventive detention entirely, it only 
upholds the practice for limited reasons, notably where there are inadequate 
means to address an individual’s flight risk and dangerousness). 
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judiciary,105 the Court, when considering a Due Process challenge,106 has 
required the government to justify the deprivation of a noncitizen’s 
liberty.107 For the purpose of this analysis, I focus on cases that do not 
 
105. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu 
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (“It is not within the province of 
the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor 
acquired any domicil or residence within the United States, nor even been 
admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in 
opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and 
executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the 
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers 
expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”); The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); Cole, supra note 6, at 1011–21, 
1038. 
106. In The Japanese Immigrant Case, the Supreme Court decided that 
noncitizens could claim the protections of the Due Process Clause in 
deportation proceedings. 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). The Court has repeatedly 
stated that all “persons,” regardless of whether they are citizens, are entitled 
to Due Process protections. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 
(“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the Unites States, 
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, 
or permanent.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding that due 
process still applies to aliens who entered the country unlawfully). 
107. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (“[T]hat power [the plenary power] is 
subject to important constitutional limitations.”); see also Cole, supra note 6, 
at 1038 (arguing that defenders of unchecked detention as part of the 
deportation process “have confused the power to deport with the power to 
detain”); see also id. at 1016 (“[A]t the very height of deference to plenary 
immigration power, the Court in Wong Wing applied to immigration 
detention the same principle that it has subsequently applied in other civil 
detention cases: an absolute prohibition of the use of civil detention for 
punitive ends.” (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228 (1896))). A notable 
exception is the Court’s holding that the Due Process Clause does not apply 
to those who are seeking admission to the U.S. In the 1953 decision in 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court permitted the indefinite 
detention of a noncitizen against a Due Process challenge. 345 U.S. 206, 215 
(1953). Mr. Mezei had been a lawful permanent resident, but had 
extinguished all of his rights when he left the U.S. without authorization or a 
reentry permit and spent nineteen months “behind the Iron Curtain;” thus, 
he was treated as though he was “stopped at the border,” which meant that 
he had no constitutional rights to assert in the face of his detention. See id. 
at 214–15 (finding Mezei’s absence to be a break in continuous residence and 
that he was therefore assimilated to the status of one who was first arriving 
in the U.S.); see also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due 
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”). The only rights he 
could claim were statutory, and Congress had not given him the statutory 
right to be free from detention. See id. (distinguishing Mezei’s contention as 
a “matter of privilege” as opposed to a “vested right”). Because of Mezei’s 
“entry fiction,” persons who are subject to this form of detention “are legally 
positioned as outside the national territory” and therefore are “beyond the 
reach of the Due Process Clause and its presumption of liberty.” César 
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involve the detention of noncitizens during a time of war,108 as that 
would invoke an entirely different Due Process rationale for civil 
detention and is not at issue when a court decides the typical 
discretionary bond case under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).109 
In the 1952 case Carlson v. Landon,110 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the denial of immigration bail for several noncitizens 
who were deportable as communists under the 1950 Internal Security 
Act.111 Carlson, which is probably one of the Court’s harshest im-
migration detention cases, affirms what was a presumption against de-
tention for the vast majority of those subject to deportation. After just-
ifying detention as part of the deportation process, the Court goes on 
to say “[o]f course purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to 
all aliens subject to deportation, so discretion was placed by the 1950 
Act in the Attorney General to detain aliens without bail . . . .”112 The 
Court allowed for detention of this particular class of detainees, 
however, because the detainees fit within a category of persons that 
 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in 
Immigration Detention, 57 How. L.J. 869, 880 (2014). The Mezei decision 
suffers from serious flaws, which others have noted. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1393–94 (1953) (stating that 
“the Constitution always applies when a court is sitting with jurisdiction in 
habeas corpus” but that “the requirements of due process must vary with the 
circumstances”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The 
Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 365, 374 
(2002) (characterizing as “wildly out of step with modern constitutional law” 
the Mezei Court’s affirmance of Knauff’s holding that “[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied 
entry is concerned”). Courts can resolve the burden of proof question in bond 
hearings without resolving the issue of the so-called “arriving aliens,” because 
the discretionary bond statute at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), does not apply to 
the detention of those who have not been admitted to the U.S. Rather, it is 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) that governs their detention; so that issue can be left for 
another day. See infra note 250. 
108. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (upholding the Attorney 
General’s detention and deportation of a German noncitizen under the Alien 
Enemy Act after a finding of dangerousness); see also Klein & Wittes, supra 
note 86, at 102–11 (describing the history of detaining noncitizens during 
times of war). 
109. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 46, at 707–08 (outlining the three justifications 
for civil detention, one of which is detention during war); see also Wilsher, 
supra note 77, at 1 (“Wars created ‘enemy aliens’ who were dealt with under 
the government’s war powers and according to customary international law 
with its reciprocal arrangements for prisoner exchange.”). 
110. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
111. Id. at 537–38. 
112. Id. at 538. 
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Congress had described, by statute, to be presumptively dangerous.113 
Congress had essentially done the government’s work to justify the 
dangerousness of communists and anarchists by passing the Internal 
Security Act, which allowed for their deportation. The Court allowed 
the government to cite to that statute to justify its detention decision;114 
in fact, when describing the statutory scheme, the Court wrote that it 
mandated the Attorney General to “justify his refusal of bail by 
reference to the legislative scheme to eradicate the evils of Communist 
activity.”115 
In the 1993 case of Reno v. Flores,116 the Court rejected a Due 
Process challenge to an INS regulation that prevented unaccompanied 
juveniles from being released to a sponsor of their choice if there was 
no available parent or legal guardian.117 The case, by its very terms, did 
not concern the type of physical restraint inherent to detention.118 The 
Flores Court noted Patel’s longstanding presumption of freedom, but 
wrote “in enacting the precursor to [the then-existing detention statute] 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress eliminated any presumption of release 
pending deportation, committing that determination to the discretion 
of the Attorney General.”119 The Flores majority cited to a supposed 
reversal of the presumption of release by citing Carlson, yet the Flores 
Court did not acknowledge Carlson’s express language that the 
“purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens subject 
 
113. Id. at 534–35. Although the noncitizens had been found to not be a flight 
risk, the Court also suggested that one could presume flight risk in their 
cases, due to their membership in the Communist Party, which made 
“[d]eportation [] more likely.” Id. at 541 n.35. 
114. See id. at 541 (dismissing the need for the Government to provide additional 
evidence other than Communist Party membership). 
115. Id. at 543; see also id. at 544 (“The authority to detain without bail is to be 
exercised within the framework of the Subversive Activities Control Act to 
guard against Communist activities pending deportation hearings.”). 
116. 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
117. Id. at 296–97, 302–06. 
118. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 (“The ‘freedom from physical restraint’ invoked 
by respondents is not at issue in this case.”). Instead, Flores dealt with “the 
alleged right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal 
guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the 
custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a government-
operated or government-selected child-care institution.” Id. In fact, the 
Court was very careful to refer to the challenged government action as “legal 
custody,” not “detention,” since the children were not detained in 
correctional institutions, but non-secure facilities licensed to provide shelter, 
foster, or group care to dependent children. Id. at 298. So “shackles, chains, 
or barred cells” were not at issue, like in the case of adult detention. Id. at 
302. 
119. Id. at 306. 
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to deportation . . . .”120 Also, committing the determination of release 
to the discretion of the Attorney General, the government action the 
Court upheld in Carlson, can still be done while maintaining the 
presumption of release. That was the state of affairs when the Board 
decided Matter of Patel—the presumption of release existed, yet the 
Attorney General had discretion to decide who should be released 
against the backdrop of this presumption.121 Indeed, it would be odd for 
the Supreme Court, in 1952, to “reverse” a presumption of release that 
the Board stated in 1976, twenty-four years later. Thus the Flores case, 
due to both its misguided statement about a supposed reversal of the 
presumption of freedom and its painstaking efforts to not invoke the 
right to be free from physical confinement, cannot be read to mean that 
adult noncitizens in jail have a diminished right to be free.122 
In 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis,123 the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a statute that the INS interpreted to permit indefinite de-
tention of noncitizens who were ordered removed, but remained indef-
initely detained because they were either stateless or their governments 
refused to repatriate them.124 The Court stated, “government detention 
violates [the Fifth Amendment Due Process] Clause unless the 
detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural 
protections or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive 
‘circumstances,’ where a special justification, such as harm-threatening 
mental illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding physical restraint.’”125 The Zadvydas Court made 
two important statements regarding the burden of proof. First, al-
 
120. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952). 
121. See 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976). 
122. Indeed, when the Supreme Court decided a Due Process challenge to adult 
immigration detention in Zadvydas v. Davis, the majority opinion did not 
even mention Flores. See generally 533 U.S. 678, 682–702 (2001). Justice 
Scalia, dissenting in Zadvydas, cited Flores for the proposition that when 
considering a Due Process challenge, the Court should begin with a “careful 
description” of the substantive right claimed. Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 302). Justice Scalia, instead of 
describing the petitioners’ claims in Zadvydas as a right to be free from 
physical restraint, stated that “it is at bottom a claimed right of release into 
this country by an individual who concededly has no legal right to be here. 
There is no such constitutional right.” Id. at 703; see also id. at 720 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The due process analysis must begin with a 
‘careful description of the asserted right.’” (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 
302)). 
123. Id. at 678. 
124. Id. at 684–85. 
125. Id. at 690 (citations omitted). 
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though there was a regulation allowing for a deportation officer to re-
view the detainee’s custody, the Court emphasized the constitutional 
inadequacy of a custody review procedure where “the alien bears the 
burden of proving he is not dangerous.”126 Second, the Court did not 
agree with the government’s arguments that mandatory detention is 
the rule while discretionary release is the narrow exception.127 Rather, 
the Court observed that unlike 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (the mandatory 
detention statute), the statute at issue was not carefully crafted to 
apply to only those deemed “presumptively unbailable,” but also to 
“ordinary visa violators,” and had no obvious termination point.128 The 
Court resolved the constitutional issue by avoiding it, instead inter-
preting the post-order custody review statute as not permitting deten-
tion beyond six months.129 However, its rhetoric about the consti-
tutionality of immigration detention suggested that the Court would 
require the government to provide special justification for its immigra-
tion detention decisions, as it had required of the government in other 
civil detention contexts.130 
As to this issue of whether deportation was foreseeable, however, 
the Zadvydas Court did place the burden on the detainee to “provide[] 
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 
in the reasonably foreseeable future.”131 In response, the government 
would have to respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.132 
This allocation of the burden of proof in what would seem like the 
watershed case for the Due Process right to be free from immigration 
detention, at first glance, appears to be inconsistent with the civil 
detention cases where the government always had to bear the burden 
of proof.133 However, this burden allocation appears to place the burden 
of production on the detainee, but the ultimate burden of persuasion 
 
126. Id. at 692. 
127. Id. at 697. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 699–701. 
130. See Cole, supra note 6, at 1017–21 (discussing the Zadvydas Court’s 
constitutional concerns if indefinite detention of aliens known as “lifers” were 
authorized by immigration law); Taylor, supra note 24, at 364. 
131. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 
132. Id. 
133. See e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81–82 (1992) (placing the burden 
on the detainee to prove he is not dangerous is not sufficient to defeat an 
individual’s liberty interest under the Constitution); Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (concluding that the state is required to justify 
confinement by more than a preponderance of the evidence because of the 
gravity of the potential outcome on the individual).  
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on the government.134 Also, it is important to note what types of 
presumptions the Zadvydas Court allowed. A presumption of danger-
ousness or flight risk was constitutionally suspicious, the Court 
reasoned.135 A presumption that most noncitizens, once subject to a 
final order of removal, could be deported, would not be as proble-
matic;136 thus, it would be fair to require the detainee to at least initially 
come forward with some evidence to show that he could not be de-
ported. 
In the 2003 decision Demore v. Kim,137 the Court, in a 5–4 decision, 
upheld the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), against a 
Due Process challenge. The Court cited language dating back to the 
eras of the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Cold War to reason that 
detention is a necessary part of the removal process.138 The Court held 
that Congress could categorically deem certain persons to be a danger—
those I refer to as “presumptively unbailable”—and not give them an 
individualized hearing with respect to dangerousness or flight risk.139 
Relying on Carlson, the Court in Demore reasoned that denial of bail 
was permissible “by reference to a legislative scheme” that presumed 
 
134. In this sense, it is similar to the presumptions at play in the Bail Reform 
Act, where the detainee, if he is charged with a presumptively dangerous 
crime under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), must bear the burden of production. It is 
then the government that must bear the burden of persuasion that the 
detainee is a danger. See, e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380–
81 (1st Cir. 1985) (determining that, in construing the Bail Reform Act of 
1984, “Congress did not intend to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant but intended to impose only a burden of production”); U.S. v. 
Diaz, 777 F.2d 1236, 1238 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Fortna, 
769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Carbone, 793 
F.2d 559, 560 (3d Cir. 1986) (same). 
135. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692 (discussing the “sole procedural protections” 
available to detainees, which include an administrative proceeding in which 
the detainee bears the burden of proof, and reasoning that it may be 
constitutionally impermissible to grant an administrative agency 
unreviewable authority to make decisions implicating fundamental rights 
such as detention). 
136. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992) (concluding that the 
presumption of competence does not violate Due Process Clause). 
137. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
138. Id. at 523–25 (first citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 
(1896); then citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)). 
139. See id. at 531 (finding that detention is “constitutionally permissible” 
during removal proceedings). But see id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (“The Court’s holding that the Constitution permits the 
Government to lock up a lawful permanent resident of this country when 
there is concededly no reason to do so forgets over a century of precedent 
acknowledging the rights of permanent residents, including the basic liberty 
from physical confinement lying at the heart of due process.”). 
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their flight risk and dangerousness (in Carlson, the legislative scheme 
at issue presumed dangerousness of communists and anarchists; in 
Demore, it was criminals and terrorists).140 Indeed, the Court was 
careful to describe the reports from which Congress based its 
presumptions.141 As in Carlson, the Court allowed the government to 
carry its burden of proving dangerousness and flight risk by reference 
to a Congressional categorization of certain types of offenders as 
dangerous or a flight risk. 
To many scholars, Demore stands as a blow to the principles of 
individualized determination that the Due Process Clause expounds.142 
The decision, however, can be read quite narrowly—as upholding the 
constitutionality of mandatory detention for a particular class of de-
tainees, the “presumptively unbailable,” whose detention was necessary 
for the “limited period”143 of his removal proceedings (which the Court 
believed would conclude within a month).144 When read this way, the 
Demore decision is no different than the Court’s prior constitutional 
decisions regarding civil detention145—especially when Justice Kennedy, 
providing the fifth vote, focused partially on the availability of an 
individualized hearing regarding whether someone was properly in the 
mandatory detention category.146  
140. Id. at 524–25. 
141. See id. at 518–21 (referring to several studies that Congress relied on). 
142. See Cole, supra note 46, at 716–17 (“The Court’s reasoning in [Demore v. 
Kim] is flawed, as it proffers no good reason for discarding the requirement 
of individualized need before subjecting a human being to preventive 
detention.”). Margaret Taylor describes the case in terms of legal realism, 
since it was decided in a post-September 11th world, which provides a striking 
contrast to Zadvydas, which was decided before September 11th, 2001. 
Taylor, supra note 24, at 345. 
143. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. 
144. See id. at 529 (citing to Executive Office for Immigration Review statistics 
calculating that, in 85% of the cases in which noncitizens are detained 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), “removal proceedings are completed in an 
average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days”). 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (upholding 
pretrial detention for a narrow class of persons whose charged offenses 
Congress deemed to make them a danger to the community). 
146. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531–32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Joseph, 
22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999)) (describing procedures, laid out in the 
Board’s decision in Matter of Joseph, whereby a mandatory detainee can 
seek review by an immigration judge about whether he is properly included 
in a mandatory detention category, and stating that “due process requires 
individualized procedures to ensure there is at least some merit to the [INS]’s 
charge and, therefore, sufficient justification to detain a lawful permanent 
resident alien pending a more formal hearing”); see also id. at 514 n.3 
(“Because respondent conceded that he was deportable because of a 
conviction that triggers § 1226(c) and thus sought no Joseph hearing, we 
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What is an important distinguishing point for the burden of proof 
analysis is the type of detention that was not at issue in Demore—the 
detention of noncitizens under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the discretionary 
bond statute. Because Demore only addressed a Due Process challenge 
to those whom the majority deemed to have conceded were covered by 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)147—the “presumptively unbailable”—the Court did 
not address what procedures would withstand a Due Process challenge 
for the non-“presumptively unbailable” detainees,148 such as “ordinary 
visa violators.”149 
C. The Supreme Court’s Next Chapter: Jennings v. Rodriguez 
Following Demore, several courts of appeals decided that the decis-
ion was very limited, applying only to the subset of noncitizens descri-
bed in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and only for the “brief period” necessary for 
removal proceedings.150 When asked how “brief” that period should be,  
have no occasion to review the adequacy of Joseph hearings generally in 
screening out those who are improperly detained pursuant to § 1226(c).”). 
Justice Kennedy also focused on the short length of detention, noting that 
“a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to 
an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if 
the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–86); 
see also Cole, supra note 46, at 717 (describing Demore as an outlier for 
upholding preventive detention without the usual showing necessary, but 
that “even there the crucial fifth vote stressed the importance of at least 
some kind of individualized determination.”). 
147. Whether Mr. Kim actually conceded that he was removable during his 
removal hearings was a point of disagreement between the majority and the 
dissent. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 522–23; id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (determining that Mr. Kim did not seek relief in the form of a 
Joseph hearing, where he could argue he was not properly included in a 
mandatory detention category). But see id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (reasoning that the majority was mistaken that he 
“conceded” removability). 
148. Indeed, had the Court permitted a bond hearing in Demore, it could have 
fallen back on the statutory mandate in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which expressly 
places the burden of proof on the few detainees who can be released. Of course, 
the Court would then have had to assess the constitutionality of this statutory 
burden allocation. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81–82 (1992) 
(assessing the constitutionality of the statutory burden allocation in a 
Louisiana statute mandating confinement for mentally ill offenders deemed 
demonstrably dangerous to the community). 
149. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697 (noting the broad application of the statute 
at issue to “ordinary visa violators” in distinguishing it from statutes that 
require the detention of criminal noncitizens). 
150. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 493–94 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that 
“categorical and mandatory detention” is constitutional if the duration is brief 
and reasonable); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(noting that its decision is consistent with the Court’s decision in Demore 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings 
108 
several courts found that six months was a reasonable period of time 
for mandatory detention to last under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).151 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a series of cases that culminated in the 
2015 decision in Rodriguez v. Robbins,152 recognized a class of detainees 
in mandatory detention, guaranteeing a bond hearing for each detainee 
once mandatory detention reached six months.153 The Court, following 
Demore, held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) was 
constitutional, but that once detention became prolonged, principles of 
constitutional avoidance required it to apply the discretionary bond 
authority at § 1226(a), not the detention mandate at § 1226(c).154 
In prior cases leading up to Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit had placed 
the burden of proof on the government during these bond hearings 
provided for detainees whose removal proceedings extended beyond six 
months;155 the Rodriguez court continued that burden allocation on the 
government.156 In the first decision concerning the burden of proof for a 
prolonged mandatory detention case, Tijani v. Willis,157 the Ninth 
 
because of the brevity of the detention); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 
(2d Cir. 2015) (holding that there is an implicit temporal limitation in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 521, 523 (describing how 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) only applies to “a subset of deportable criminal aliens” and for only 
the “brief period” necessary for removal proceedings). 
151. See Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1079–80 (collecting cases). 
152. 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). There were several decisions leading up to the 
Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision; the 2015 case was the third appeal. Id. at 1065. 
153. Id. at 1074, 1081. 
154. Id. at 1068; see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 
2013) [hereinafter Rodriguez II] (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is 
inapplicable after a prolonged detention). The Court similarly found that for 
those “arriving aliens” detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), the statute 
authorized a brief period of mandatory detention; after six months of 
detention, however, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) would apply. Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 
1070, 1082–83; Rodriguez II, 715 F. 3d at 1144. Additionally, the court held 
that for those detainees in discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 
the government must provide a bond hearing every six months. Rodriguez, 
804 F.3d at 1085, 1089. 
155. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950–51 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that prolonged pre-removal order detention without 
adequate procedural protections would raise serious constitutional concerns, 
so therefore reading the mandatory detention statute to provide a bond 
hearing at six months and at such bond hearing, placing burden of proof on 
the government); see also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 
2011) (holding that for a Casas-Castrillon bond hearing, government must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that detainee is a danger and a flight 
risk). 
156. Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1087; Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1144. 
157. 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Circuit, in a very short opinion, placed the burden of proof on the 
government without any analysis.158 Judge Tashima, concurring, 
supported this burden allocation by citing to decisions in other civil 
detention contexts,159 summarizing them by stating: “when a fund-
amental right, such as individual liberty, is at stake, the government 
must bear the lion’s share of the burden.”160 Subsequent decisions relied 
on Tijani’s placement of the burden of proof on the government without 
significant discussion.161 
In June 2016, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari of the 
Rodriguez decision.162 The Solicitor General’s petition for certiorari ex-
plains the regulations and Board decisions that I have outlined in this 
Article pertaining to the burden of proof.163 However, in contrast to the 
argument in this Article, that the former INS and Board essentially 
rewrote the constitutionally-sound presumption against detention set 
forth in Matter of Patel, the Solicitor General complains that the Ninth 
Circuit has undone the handiwork of the late 1990s immigration 
detention scheme. The petition for certiorari complains that “[t]he 
Ninth Circuit has rewritten the statutory and regulatory framework 
governing detention of aliens in removal proceedings . . . The court has 
turned that scheme on its head, requiring the government to prove—by 
clear and convincing evidence—that the alien is a flight risk or a danger 
to the community . . . .”164 
 
158. Id. at 1242. 
159. Id. at 1245 (Tashima, J., concurring) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418 (1979); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745 (1982); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)). 
160. Id. at 1245. In that decision, Judge Tashima was primarily discussing the 
burden of proof placed on mandatory detainees to prove that they are not 
properly included in a mandatory detention category. Id. at 1243–47. For 
these hearings, referred to as “Joseph” hearings, mandatory detainees, in 
order to have a bond hearing, must prove that the government is 
substantially unlikely to prevail on its arguments that the detainee is 
properly included in a mandatory detention category. Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 799, 806 (B.I.A. 1999). Judge Tashima wrote that the “Joseph standard 
is not just unconstitutional, it is egregiously so. The standard not only places 
the burden on the defendant to prove that he should not be physically 
detained, it makes that burden all but insurmountable.” Tijani, 430 F.3d at 
1246 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
161. See Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 
2008) (adopting the burden of proof allocation established in Tijani); Cf. 
Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–06 (assuming the government bears 
burden of proof and discussing why the standard of proof should be clear 
and convincing evidence in Casas-Castrillon bond hearings). 
162. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).  
163. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 3–6. 
164. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). 
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It is yet to be seen whether the Court will return to the Matter of 
Patel days when the presumption of freedom was the norm. It is pos-
sible that the Court will not even address this issue; it could, for ex-
ample, decide that the Rodriguez class members have no right to a bond 
hearing, which would render a decision about the burden of proof moot. 
The Court also could decide that the burden of proof should rest with 
the government only because the detainees are in prolonged detention—
so there is something special about the lengthy nature of their detention 
that requires the government to justify it.165 This would leave all of the 
detainees with initial bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the 
discretionary detention statute, bearing the burden of proof under the 
relevant Board case law.166 This would be both unconstitutional and 
inconsistent with the statute’s placement of the burden on the 
government for removability decisions. 
III. The Burden of Proof in Bond Hearings:  
The Outlier 
In this section, I examine theories behind why burdens of proof exist 
in the law and apply these theories to the various burdens of proof in 
immigration law. I aim to show that when one applies these theories to 
immigration law’s burdens, the detainee-borne burden of proof in bond 
proceedings is the one outlier. 
To put the burden assignments in context, let us consider a 
hypothetical case. Roberto is arrested during an ICE raid of a factory 
where he works. In his removal case, Roberto wishes to assert his right 
to remain silent so as to hold ICE to its burden of proving alienage.167  
165. This would be consistent with the idea that prolonged detention is more like 
the indefinite nature of civil commitment, which the Supreme Court has held 
requires the government to justify by clear and convincing evidence. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979); see also Diouf v. Napolitano, 
634 F.3d 1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2011) (“When the period of detention 
becomes prolonged . . . greater procedural safeguards 
are . . . required . . . [because] the private interests at stake are profound.”). 
However, in another civil detention context, the Court upheld the much 
more brief pretrial detention because the government bore the burden of 
proof. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). 
166. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006) (placing the burden on an 
alien in a custody determination to establish to an Immigration Judge and 
Board that he or she is not dangerous, is not a threat to national security, 
and is not a flight risk); Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (B.I.A 1999) 
(holding that an alien must not be released if he or she would be a danger 
to people or property). 
167. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2014) (“In the case of a respondent charged as 
being in the United States without being admitted or paroled, the Service 
must first establish the alienage of the respondent.”). The Board has held 
that although judges can draw an adverse inference from silence, this does 
not meet the government’s burden of proving alienage by clear and 
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The only evidence of alienage ICE has is his admission of foreign birth 
when he was arrested, which he will argue should be suppressed, as his 
Fourth Amendment rights were egregiously violated when ICE took 
this statement (ICE forced a confession under duress).168 His bond case, 
however, will typically happen first, since he strongly desires to be 
released while he seeks to vindicate his rights in removal proceedings. 
In the bond hearing, to meet his burden to disprove dangerousness or 
flight risk, he is forced to give evidence of his identity, which includes 
an admission of alienage. Although the bond and removal records are 
technically separate, the government could submit this evidence of 
alienage from the bond record into the removal record.169 One might  
convincing evidence. Guevara, 20 I. & N. Dec. 238 (B.I.A. 1990); see also 
Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as 
Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 599, 602 (1990) 
(arguing that respondents in deportation proceedings cannot be compelled 
to testify and that this silence cannot support an order of deportation); id. 
at 603 (“[T]here is no doubt that the privilege [against self-incrimination] 
may be asserted in this context, where the testimony sought might result in 
criminal prosecution in addition to deportation.”); id. at 626–29 (chronicling 
the legislative history behind the requirement that the government first 
prove alienage in a deportation case). 
168. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (holding that, while 
the exclusionary rule is available in such proceedings, it is only available 
where there has been an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment); 
Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1977) (suppressing 
noncitizen’s confession of alienage when confession was coerced by INS 
agent). 
169. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) states that “[c]onsideration by the Immigration Judge 
of an application or request of a respondent regarding custody or bond shall 
be separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or 
removal hearing or proceeding. Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. Dep’t. 
of Just., Executive Off. for Immigr. Rev., Immigration Court 
Practice Manual § 9.3(a) (2013) (“Bond proceedings are separate from 
removal proceedings.”). However, there is another regulation, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.7(a), which allows the receipt into evidence of an “oral or written 
statement” made by the respondent or another person during “any 
investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.” Id. The Immigration Judge 
Benchbook reconciles these regulations by advising immigration judges that 
it is permissible to use such prior statements made in a bond proceeding so 
long as “the evidence is reintroduced and received in the deportation or 
removal hearing.” United States Dep't of Justice, Immigration Judge 
Benchbook Evidence Introductory Guide, (Mar. 3 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites 
/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Evidence_Guide.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/48FG-AK6R]. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did 
not permit an immigration judge to use her notes from a bond hearing in the 
removal hearing because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) precluded any evidence from 
a bond hearing from being used in a removal hearing. Joseph v. Holder, 600 
F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2010). The court did not need to resolve the 
meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) because the judge did not rely on prior 
written statements and, because no transcript existed of the bond hearing, 
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wonder, what is the point of requiring the government to prove 
removability when it can simply detain Roberto, thus dangling his 
physical freedom over his head and forcing him to prove the 
government’s removability case? 
A. Why Burdens of Proof Exist 
Richard Gaskins wrote in his 1992 book, Burdens of Proof in 
Modern Discourse,170 “the underlying issue is about presumptions: what 
conclusions can be drawn from controversial or indeterminate evi-
dence.”171 Gaskins wrote that in traditional legal theory, the party who 
seeks law’s intervention is the party who bears the burden of proof (in 
civil cases, the plaintiff; in criminal cases, the government).172 Evidence 
scholar Lawrence Solum, responding to Gaskins’ book, has written that, 
because burdens of proof deal with uncertainty in the evidence, ideally 
the burden is proof is allocated to “maximize[] the likelihood that the 
decision will be accurate.”173 Solum argues that where accuracy cannot 
be achieved via a burden allocation, the burden of proof should be 
allocated to fulfill some other end, such as fairness.174 This observation 
is similar to evidence scholar Ronald Allen’s statement that: “When 
there is reason to prefer errors to be skewed against a class of 
litigants . . . the burden of persuasion changes to reflect our 
preferences.”175 
Applying Gaskins’ traditional theory of burden of proof allocation, 
one can see why, in the deportability context, the burden of proof is on 
the government. The government is the party that seeks the law’s inter-
vention—to deport someone who otherwise has the right to be here.176 
 
she did not rely on prior oral statements. Id. at 1241; see also Adeniji, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (B.I.A. 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting) 
(“The underlying purpose of [8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)] is not to limit the 
information an Immigration Judge may consider in redetermining bond, but 
to ensure that evidence presented in the far more informal bond hearing does 
not taint the ultimate adjudication of the charges of removability . . . .”). 
170. Gaskins, supra note 5. 
171. Id. at 22. 
172. Id. at 23. 
173. Lawrence B. Solum, You Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 691, 701 (1994). 
174. Id. 
175. Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern 
Legal Discourse, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 627, 634 (1994). 
176. See Gaskins, supra note 5, at 23 (“Traditional legal commentary has been 
comfortable placing burdens on the party seeking the law’s intervention: on 
the plaintiff in civil cases and on the prosecution in criminal trials.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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This rationale is reflected in the Court’s Woodby decision, which 
justified a heightened burden of proof for deportation,177 stating, “[t]his 
Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that may follow 
when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to 
forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he 
often has no contemporary identification.”178 Since the government is 
the one upsetting the status quo, compelling the noncitizen to leave his 
life in the U.S., and seeking the law to assist with this, it is the 
government that should bear the burden of proof when an immigration 
judge is dealing with indeterminate evidence.179 
In Woodby, the government sought to deport a permanent re-
sident.180 Our hypothetical detainee Roberto, however, has no such right 
to remain; according to ICE, he entered the country without inspection. 
But how do we know this? How do we know that he is not a citizen of 
the United States? If he does not provide evidence of his foreign birth, 
the only evidence of alienage the government can use is a statement 
that may not be very reliable, as it was taken under enough duress to 
warrant suppression.181 Does evidence that he speaks Spanish or appears 
of Latino heritage prove that he is not a citizen?182 The United States  
177. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966) (“But it does not 
syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon 
no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case.”). 
178. Id. at 285. 
179. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012) (“[T]he [government] has the burden 
of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien 
who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.”). 
Similarly, in Schneiderman v. United States, the Court wrote “the 
Government seeks to turn the clock back twelve years after full citizenship 
was conferred upon petitioner by judicial decree, and to deprive him of the 
priceless benefits that derive from that status.” 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943) 
(requiring the government to prove denaturalization by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
180. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 280. 
181. See, e.g., Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 807 (1977) (reasoning that a 
coerced statement obtained by an INS agent, which was the sole evidence of 
alienage, was unreliable and should be suppressed). 
182. Significant debate about what makes a person appear to be undocumented 
arose following the enactment of Arizona’s “show me your papers” law, 
which “require[d] state officers to make a ‘reasonable attempt . . . to 
determine the immigration status’ of any person they stop, detain, or arrest 
on some other legitimate basis if ‘reasonable suspicion exists that the person 
is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.’” Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11–
1051(B) (West 2012)). See, e.g., Robert Lovato, Arizona’s Immigrants 
Under ‘Reasonable Suspicion,’ The Nation (June 26, 2012), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/arizonas-immigrants-under-reasonable-
suspicion/ [https://perma.cc/7KPJ-JMUY] (suggesting that by upholding 
Arizona’s “reasonable suspicion” provisions, the Supreme Court generated 
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does not require citizens to carry proof of their citizenship,183 and 
immigration law has long placed the burden of proving alienage on the 
government.184 Thus, the immigration law reflects a societal 
presumption of citizenship. The government must justify seeking law’s 
intervention to send away someone they have not yet proven is an 
“alien.”185 
In contrast, when a noncitizen seeks a benefit such as citizenship or 
relief from removal, the burden of proof is on him,186 as he is now seeking 
law’s intervention to alter the status quo—to allow him to stay once 
found removable or allow him to become a citizen. This contrast 
between the differing burdens of proof is reflected in the Supreme 
Court’s 1967 decision in Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service,187 where the Court upheld a decision denying an 
application for naturalization. The Court wrote: 
When the Government seeks to strip a person of citizenship al-
ready acquired, or deport a resident alien and send him from our 
shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.” But when an alien seeks 
to obtain the privileges and benefits of citizenship, the shoe is on 
the other foot. He is the moving party, affirmatively asking the 
 
potential for wide-scale racial profiling); Randal C. Archibold, Arizona 
Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. Times, (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html [https:// 
perma.cc/87VS-EL6W] (“Opponents have called it an open invitation for 
harassment and discrimination against Hispanics regardless of their 
citizenship status.”). 
183. See Do We Need a National ID Card?, Wash. Times (Dec. 21, 2004), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/dec/21/20041221-084703-
1397r/ [https://perma.cc/3B4Q-7P5R] (discussing how many Americans are 
against the idea of a national identity card “because we do not want big 
brother government to monitor us (we all know the potential horrors from 
the Gestapo and sci-fi movies)”). 
184. Examining the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1924, which first 
required the government to bear the burden of proving alienage in deportation 
proceedings, Daniel Kanstroom cites to the sponsor’s statements that such a 
burden placement was consistent with the “basic principles of the United 
States guaranteeing everybody, when accused of any crime, the right of a 
supposition of innocence until they are proven guilty.” Kanstroom, supra note 
167, at 626–29 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 6252 (1924)). 
185. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2007). 
186. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2012) (placing the burden of proof on the 
noncitizen in application for relief from removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012) 
(placing the burden of proof on applicant for naturalization). 
187. 385 U.S. 630 (1967). 
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Government to endow him with all the advantages of 
citizenship.188 
Similarly, when a noncitizen seeks admission to the United States, 
he must prove that he is “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be ad-
mitted.”189 He is seeking law’s intervention to alter the status quo—to 
allow him entry into the United States. There are, however, some re-
turning lawful permanent residents who are deemed by law to be 
“seeking an admission” because they have left the country for too long, 
been convicted of certain crimes, or engaged in illegal activity after 
departing the U.S.190 For these returning permanent residents, the 
government bears the burden of proving that they are “seeking admis-
sion.”191 In this admission decision, it is the government that seeks law’s 
intervention to alter the status quo—a lawful permanent resident would 
otherwise have the right to travel freely in and out of the United States, 
and return to his life in the United States.192 Thus, it is the government 
 
188. Id. at 636–37 (citations omitted). 
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012). Other reasons why a lawful permanent 
resident may be deemed to be “seeking an admission” is if he abandoned 
his status or is attempting to enter the U.S. without authorization. Id. 
191. While the noncitizen bears the initial burden of production, DHS bears the 
burden of persuasion. See Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749, 754 (B.I.A. 1988) 
(once returning LPR presents “colorable claim” to returning LPR status, 
government bears burden of proving abandonment by clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence); see also Matadin v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 85, 90–91 
(2d Cir. 2008) (following Huang’s burden of proof allocation, notwith-
standing 1997 amendment to definition of “admission”); Khodagholian v. 
Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). The Supreme Court, 
when it held that returning LPRs placed in exclusion proceedings have 
procedural Due Process rights, did not decide what process was due to the 
returning LPR. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 37 (1982) 
(remanding the case for consideration of the due process question). The 
Court did note, however, that “the BIA has followed the practice of placing 
the burden on the Government when the alien is a permanent resident alien.” 
Id. at 35. 
192. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012) (“An alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking 
an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws 
unless the alien . . . .” (emphasis added)); Pena, 26 I. & N. Dec. 613, 618 
(B.I.A. 2015) (“[W]e conclude that a returning lawful permanent resident 
who does not fall within one of the exceptions in section 101(a)(13)(C) of 
the Act cannot be regarded as seeking admission to the United States.”); 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 544 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (“LPRs[’] . . . lives are generally indistinguishable from those of 
United States citizens.”). 
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that bears the burden of proving that the permanent resident is reduced 
to the status of an “arriving alien.”193 
For those who are seeking admission, naturalization, or relief from 
removal, the burden of proof allocation also reflects a societal 
preference—that entry into the United States community should not 
be open to all.194 The United States has long jealously guarded its na-
tional community, allowing only those Congress deems worthy of ad-
mission to become lawful permanent residents or citizens.195 That an 
outsider should have to bear the burden of proving admission to that 
national community reflects this societal preference. 
Similarly, a noncitizen who has entered without inspection and thus 
not been admitted to the U.S., even if he has lived in the U.S. for a 
long time, must prove that he is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to 
be admitted.196 In this context, the government has started the removal 
process, altering the status quo, and thus must first prove that he is an 
“alien,” notwithstanding his physical presence in the United States.197 
Once the government meets this burden, then the noncitizen must 
prove that he may be admitted to the United States. He must prove 
 
193. See 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2012) (defining “arriving alien” as an “applicant for 
admission”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012) (defining when a LPR 
may be deemed to be “seeking an admission”). 
194. All relief from removal, with the exception of voluntary departure, entitles a 
noncitizen to remain in the United States, and many forms of relief lead to 
permanent residence. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a) (providing that 
cancellation of removal for LPRs cancels removal, entitling beneficiary to 
remain in the United States); 1229b(b) (prescribing that cancellation of 
removal for non-LPRs leads to adjustment of status to permanent 
residence); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (codifying that voluntary departure permits 
noncitizen to depart voluntarily in lieu of being subject to removal 
proceedings). 
195. See Salyer, supra note 77 (chronicling Chinese Exclusion Act and other early 
United States immigration statutes restricting immigrants based on 
desirability); see also David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the 
National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
165, 181 (1983) (“For much of our history—when the continent was 
emptier—almost the only persons who pushed the idea of limits and spoke in 
worried tones about the ‘hordes’ who might enter were those with other, 
hidden agendas.”). 
196. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (“Once alienage has been established, unless the 
respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is 
lawfully in the United States pursuant to a prior admission, the respondent 
must prove that he or she is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 
admitted to the United States and is not inadmissible as charged.”). 
197. See id. (“In the case of a respondent charged as being in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled, the Service must first establish the 
alienage of the respondent.”). 
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that, as an outsider, he is deserving of membership in the national 
community. 
B. Justifying the Government’s Burden 
The “seeking law’s intervention” theory behind the allocation of the 
burden of proof justifies placing the burden of proof on the government 
when it seeks to detain someone during removal proceedings.198 In a 
typical bond case, the evidence is indeterminate—no one can predict 
whether a person will commit a crime in the future or return to court,199 
yet the immigration judge must evaluate the evidence in front of her 
and reach a decision. In the context of detention pending deportation, 
it is the government that seeks law’s intervention—to take away the 
liberty of a noncitizen who otherwise has the right to freely live in this 
country, since his removability has not been determined.200 Thus, it is 
the government that should justify law’s intervention. 
Following Solum’s discussion about allocating the burden of proof 
to maximize the likelihood of an accurate decision,201 in an immigration 
bond hearing, one may argue that it is the government that has access 
to the information that would provide the clearest picture of the 
relevant facts to ascertain dangerousness or flight risk.202 The gover-
nment can easily access criminal records from various states, whereas 
the detainee (who is often pro se, but even if he is represented)203 has 
 
198. See Gaskins, supra note 5, at 23 (“Traditional legal commentary has been 
comfortable placing burdens on the party seeking the law’s intervention: on 
the plaintiff in civil cases and on the prosecution in criminal trials.”). 
199. See, e.g., Das, supra note 7, at 146 (suggesting that the government is unable 
to accurately evaluate the future behavior of a noncitizen awaiting 
deportation proceedings); Cole, supra note 46, at 696 (same); Legomsky, 
supra note 6, at 545 (same). 
200. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B) (2012) (describing when a removal order 
becomes administratively final). But cf. Demore, 538 U.S. at 577–78 (Breyer, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (reasoning that a noncitizen’s concession that 
he is deportable earlier in the proceedings “seems to me the rough equivalent 
of the entry of an order of removal” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
699–701 (2001))). 
201. See Solum, supra note 173, at 701 (noting that “when we deal with 
ignorance, our decision about where to place the burden of proof must be 
made on some ground other than maximizing the likelihood that the decision 
will be accurate (meaning correct in the sense that it is the decision that 
would have been reached had there been no uncertainty)”). 
202. Das, supra note 7, at 156–58 (suggesting that placing the burden of proof on 
the migrant is problematic from an institutional design perspective, because 
the migrant does not have access to necessary information and immigration 
authorities need greater incentives to develop the relevant information). 
203. My own practice representing detainees in bond hearings provides ample 
examples of the difficulties of obtaining documents to prove that a detainee 
is not a danger or a flight risk. Typically, because a detainee’s liberty is at 
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difficulty accessing these records. Although it is arguably the detainee 
who has better access to rehabilitation records or mitigating 
information, here, too, one sees that within the confines of detention it 
is extremely difficult to produce such information.204 In the case of those 
who have been admitted to the U.S. on a visa, the government has easy 
access to their visa applications; detainees can get this information via 
a Freedom of Information Act request but will receive the response in 
about one month, typically after the bond hearing.205 Thus, it is the 
government that should bear the burden of producing documents. 
The burden of production is the lesser problem, especially because 
in the typical bond case, the government comes forward with some evi-
dence to prove dangerousness and flight risk.206 The government nor-
mally produces criminal records, police reports, and I-213 documents 
(the Record of Inadmissible/Deportable Alien, which I have called the 
 
stake and thus DHS, the judge, and the detainee demand a quick hearing, 
an attorney will ask for one or two weeks to prepare for a bond hearing. 
During this time, the attorney must obtain police reports and dispositions of 
criminal convictions, which are in multiple courts, some in different states; 
every court and police department has different policies about how to obtain 
these records. Obtaining documents to mitigate the gravity of the criminal 
record—i.e., through obtaining medical records proving mental illness or a 
history of childhood or domestic abuse, letters from probation officers, or 
letters from the community—also presents challenges, since some of these 
records require special authorizations signed by the detainee and 
bureaucratic waits to obtain them. Even obtaining community letters can be 
difficult, as community members may not initially trust the lawyer to reveal 
information, or, if not in the immediate vicinity of the lawyer, may not have 
access to fax machines or scanners to immediately send support letters. 
204. See Das, supra note 7, at 157–58 (describing difficulties for detainees to access 
evidence despite an assumption that they have better access to evidence of 
positive equities such as evidence of length of residency, family ties, and 
employment history); Heeren, supra note 6, at 604 (“The burden of proof in 
the proceeding is placed on the party with the least resources—the detainee—
who is usually unrepresented and lacking the legal education necessary to 
comprehend the esoteric nuances of immigration law. Detainees often have 
difficulty making a phone call, let alone conducting legal research or gathering 
evidence.”). 
205. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Services, Current Average FOIA 
Request Processing Times, (2016) https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/ 
freedom-information-and-privacy-act-foia/foia-request-status-check-average-
processing-times/check-status-request [https://perma.cc/BE6K-5QK7]. 
206. During January of 2016, Boston College Law student Jonathan Bard 
observed thirty-three bond hearings in the Boston Immigration Court. 
During each of these bond hearings, the government presented evidence to 
prove dangerousness, flight risk, or both. Email from Jonathan Bard, to 
author (Aug. 15, 2016) (on file with author). 
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“police report of immigration law”).207 Thus, placing the burden of 
production on the government would do little to reduce the unfair 
burden allocation. The larger problem is the detainee bearing the 
burden of persuasion.208 Should the government bear the burden of per-
suasion in a bond hearing, the necessary related question is the standard 
of proof.209 
The standard of proof in bond hearings should be clear and convin-
cing evidence. The lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard that 
is normally used in civil cases should not apply,210 given the liberty 
interest at stake,211 the use of this standard of proof in other areas of 
civil detention,212 and the use of this standard of proof in other areas of 
immigration law, such as proving deportability213 and denatural-
ization.214 In 1966, when the Supreme Court decided Woodby, it 
compared deportation to denaturalization, expatriation, or other civil 
 
207. See Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 675, 695 (2015) (describing the use of I-213 forms in 
immigration courts).  
208. See United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Where the 
burden of persuasion lies may make a practical difference to a magistrate or 
judge genuinely uncertain on the basis of what the parties have presented.”); 
see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (“Part of the confusion 
surrounding the term arises from the fact that historically, the concept 
encompassed two distinct burdens: the ‘burden of persuasion,’ i.e., which 
party loses if the evidence is closely balanced, and the ‘burden of production,’ 
i.e., which party bears the obligation to come forward with the evidence at 
different points in the proceeding.”); Solum, supra note 173, at 691 
(describing the difference between the burden of production, which is “the 
requirement that a party raise an issue,” from the burden of persuasion, 
which is “the requirement that one party satisfy a standard of proof on an 
issue after it has been raised”). 
209. Id. at 691–92 (describing the burden of persuasion as having two 
components: the risk of non-persuasion, or “the consequence that flows if a 
burden of persuasion is not met,” and the standard of proof, or “the quality 
of convincingness”). 
210. See Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285 (noting that, while “a deportation proceeding 
is not a criminal prosecution . . . it does not syllogistically follow that a 
person may be banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof 
than applies in a negligence case”).  
211. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because it is 
improper to ask the individual to ‘share equally with society the risk of error 
when the possible injury to the individual’—deprivation of liberty—is so 
significant, a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof provides the 
appropriate level of procedural protection.” (quoting Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979))). 
212. See supra Part II.A. 
213. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). 
214. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943). 
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cases such as fraud, which had the clear and convincing evidence 
standard of proof.215 The Court wrote:  
The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that 
inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at 
least, result in expulsion from our shores. And many resident 
aliens have lived in this country longer and established stronger 
family, social, and economic ties here than some who have become 
naturalized citizens.216  
As compared to the permanent banishment that often accompanies 
deportation, detention, especially detention that is intended to be 
brief,217 simply does not seem as drastic. However, deprivation of liberty 
would seem to be as drastic as deportation, especially when one con-
siders how long removal proceedings can actually last (a report written 
by DHS in 2009 found that in roughly 2,100 cases per year, detention 
during removal proceedings can last one year or more).218 Moreover, 
detention, even for a short duration, is a drastic deprivation of one’s 
rights; as David Cole has said, “few state actions are more serious than 
locking up a human being.”219 This is why, in the words of the Supreme 
Court, “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
governmental action.”220 
If the government must bear the burden of proving, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that a detainee is dangerous, some of their  
215. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285–86. 
216. Id. at 286 (citation omitted). 
217. Writing to uphold mandatory detention in Demore, Justice Rehnquist cited 
statistics that led the Court to believe that a typical removal hearing where 
the person is in detention “lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast 
majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the 
minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510, 530 (2003) (citations omitted).  
218. Dora Schriro, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Immigr. and Customs 
Enforcement, Immigration Detention Overview and 
Recommendations (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odp
p/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N8Z-4JUA]. 
219. Cole, supra note 6, at 1008; see also Cole, supra note 46, at 696 (“Locking up 
human beings is one of the most extreme preventive measures a state can 
undertake; it should be reserved for situations where it is truly necessary.”). 
220. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307, 316 (1982)); see also id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“As 
incarceration of persons is the most common and one of the most feared 
instruments of state oppression and state indifference, we ought to 
acknowledge at the outset that freedom from this restraint is essential to the 
basic definition of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution.”). 
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evidence—particularly police reports and I-213 documents, many of 
which contain double hearsay (the maker of the document rarely 
appears in immigration court)—may not meet the clear and convincing 
evidence standard.221 Indeed, appellate courts have opined that police 
reports and I-213 documents cannot prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the existence of facts for removability determinations.222 What 
the government would need is more probative evidence, and the judge 
would need to scrutinize this evidence more carefully.223 This burden of 
persuasion allocation would make the government do some more work 
to justify detention, perhaps by calling in police officers to testify, 
corroborating facts like gang membership through witness testimony 
and the like.224 
 
221. See generally Holper, supra note 207 (describing the “police report” problem, 
where the government relies on unreliable hearsay evidence to prove facts in 
immigration cases and discussing how some courts have begun to question 
such reliance). 
222. See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, 
J., concurring) (reasoning that an immigration judge’s reliance on a police 
report to prove facts relevant to deportability for a criminal conviction was 
erroneous because it was not “reasonable, substantial, and probative” 
evidence that a noncitizen was deportable and did not satisfy the “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard; he also stated that “police reports are not 
especially useful instruments for finding out what persons charged actually 
did”); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing the 
“very real evidentiary concerns” that a factual inquiry allows when deciding 
deportability; these concerns include “allow[ing] immigration judge[s] to rely 
on documents of questionable veracity as ‘proof’ of an alien’s conduct. These 
documents, such as police reports and warrant applications, often contain 
little more than unsworn witness statements and initial impressions.”); see 
also Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that 
an I-213 used to prove a smuggling ground of deportability was not reliable 
evidence and listing reasons why the I-213 might be unreliable, such as when 
it contains information known to be incorrect, was drafted carelessly or 
maliciously, mischaracterized material information, was obtained by coercion 
or duress, or the information was obtained by someone other than the 
noncitizen who is the subject of the form); Garces v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 611 
F.3d 1337, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that “the arrest reports by 
themselves do not offer reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence that 
there is reason to believe Garces engaged in drug trafficking”). 
223. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Under a clear 
and convincing evidence standard, the BIA might conclude that Singh’s 
largely nonviolent prior bad acts do not demonstrate a propensity for future 
dangerousness, in view of evidence showing that his drug use, which was the 
impetus for his previous offenses, has ceased.”). 
224. Alina Das writes that in the criminal context, “the placement of a high 
burden of proof upon the government strengthens the government’s incentive 
to acquire and use information to meet its burden—particularly because the 
default option (that the defendant is acquitted) in the absence of this effort 
is, at least ex ante, undesirable to the government.” Das, supra note 7, at 
156–57 (citing Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and 
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Under Ronald Allen’s theory, when the burden allocation will not 
solve the unknown facts, as in a typical bond hearing, it is generally 
allocated to fulfill some societal preference.225 Our society’s preference 
is against the physical confinement of a human being,226 so any error 
should be skewed against the government in detention decisions. Also, 
from a fairness perspective, the government should bear the burden of 
proof.227 Otherwise, we are presuming someone is a danger—i.e., they 
will commit more crimes if they are released, yet our society generally 
presumes “that individuals have [free will] to conform their conduct to 
the law.”228 Similarly, presuming flight risk means that an individual 
will not do as they are told and return to court. Thus, presuming dan-
gerousness is much more harmful as a legal presumption than, for ex-
ample, presuming competency in a criminal case.229 Or, to use the 
Zadvydas case as an example, presuming that a detainee under an order 
of deportation can in fact be deported is fair, but presuming that he 
will commit more crimes or fail to return to court is not fair.230 
C. Responding to Critics 
A number of questions arise concerning the arguments I have set 
forth in this Article. Would requiring the government to meet a 
heightened burden to prove detention expose us to more terrorist 
attacks, as we cannot detain those who “would have opportunities to 
hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation 
 
Institutional Design, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1448 (2011) (“A prosecutor 
who believes a defendant to be guilty is more likely to invest heavily in 
evidence gathering if she knows she must prove her case beyond a reasonable 
doubt than if she knows she must prove her case only by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”)). 
225. See Allen, supra note 175, at 634. 
226. See De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 356 (B.I.A. 1991) (discussing the 
“general American presumption in favor of release, pending trial, or as in 
the immigration context, pending a deportation hearing”); supra Part II. 
227. See Solum, supra note 173, at 701 (“[W]e should assign the burden of proof 
to create incentives that will reduce future uncertainty . . . . [W]e should 
assign the burden of proof to prevent unfairness . . . .”). 
228. Cole, supra note 46, at 696. 
229. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (concluding that 
the presumption of competence does not violate the Due Process Clause). 
230. See supra notes 131–136 and accompanying text. Similarly, using the Flores 
case as an example, presuming that a noncitizen child could only be released 
to certain adults is fair, but presuming dangerousness and flight risk is unfair. 
See supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings?”231 For one, the persons about whom the government 
knows the least—those who are just coming to the United States232—
would not benefit from a government-borne burden of proof in bond 
hearings because their detention is governed by a different statute, 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b), which currently does not permit any bond hearing 
before an immigration judge.233 Because of the “entry fiction,” they 
arguably cannot claim the protections of Due Process that I have set 
forth in this Article, although many critics believe that they should not 
be beyond the reach of the Constitution234 and David Cole has offered 
a much narrower reading of the Supreme Court cases establishing the 
entry fiction.235 There are lawful permanent residents whose detention 
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); however, those are the LPRs whom 
the government charges as “arriving aliens” due to some criminal 
conduct or abandonment of status.236 Because the government bears the 
burden of proving that they should be stripped of permanent resident 
status by clear and convincing evidence,237 the government also should 
 
231. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (suggesting that detention 
prior to deportation is necessary to prevent injury to the U.S. pending the 
proceeding). 
232. See Das, supra note 7, at 146 (“The information gap is arguably widest in 
situations involving ‘arriving alien[s]’ at the border, when the federal 
government may have little or no information about the prospective 
immigrant.”). 
233. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012) (describing the process of inspection for 
noncitizens seeking admission into United States). But cf. Legomsky, supra 
note 6, at 539 (arguing that arriving aliens “do not pose any systematically 
greater threat to the public safety than does anyone else who is suspected of 
failing to meet our immigration criteria”). 
234. See supra note 106 (citing authority finding that the due process clause 
constrains governmental action in the context of immigration detention).  
235. David Cole has argued that the Court’s decision in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
which is the foundational case for the entry fiction, “does not stand for the 
sweeping proposition that aliens beyond our borders have no rights, or even 
no due process rights, but establishes only the narrower claim that because 
non-citizens have no liberty or property interest in entry they have no right 
to object to the procedures used to exclude them.” Cole, supra note 6, at 
1031–33. He writes that the Mezei Court, “[v]irtually without analysis . . . 
extended the right-privilege distinction that governed in Knauff to the distinct 
issue of indefinite detention.” Id. at 1033; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–
92, 696, 699 (interpreting statute to avoid Due Process concerns for a detainee 
under a final order of removal and stating that the individual released from 
detention does not gain a right to reside in the United States, but merely the 
right to be free of restraint on his liberty). 
236. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012) (stating when a noncitizen will not 
be regarded as attempting to gain admission to United States). 
237. See supra note 191 (detailing the burden of proof allocation). 
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bear the burden of proving their detention during these proceedings by 
clear and convincing evidence.238 
For those who are deportable due to visa overstays or post-entry 
activity, the government knows who they are because they were 
screened prior to their arrival (often twice—once at a visa interview, 
and a second time at the port of entry to the U.S.).239 Any relevant 
information about post-entry conduct is usually available to the gover-
nment (i.e. in the form of criminal records or records from state 
custody).240 
The discretionary bond statute does apply, however, to those about 
whom the government may know little—those who entered without 
 
238. Whether the government should bear the burden of proof for those who are 
in prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is one of the issues that the 
Supreme Court may consider in Jennings, should the Court decide that such 
detainees have a right to bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit found that there 
was a constitutional issue with respect to those detained under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b) because some of those detainees may be lawful permanent 
residents who are deemed to be “seeking entry” if they have committed 
certain crimes or been away from the U.S. for too long, among other reasons. 
See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(construing 8 U.S.C § 1225(b) as requiring a bond hearing after six months); 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012) (listing the conditions under which an alien 
may be regarded as "seeking an admission into the United States"); see also 
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (holding that a long-term 
permanent resident who left the country for a brief period and was placed in 
exclusion proceedings upon return was entitled to Due Process protections). 
Should the Jennings Court interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as permitting a bond 
hearing where the government bears the burden of proof to avoid the 
constitutional concerns for returning LPRs, this statutory interpretation 
would extend to those who have never been admitted to the U.S. See Clark 
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382–86 (2005) (holding that a statute may not be 
interpreted two different ways even if the constitutional concerns only apply 
to one group). 
239. A notable exception are those persons from a visa waiver country; they are 
inspected at the port of entry, although not by a U.S. consular official prior 
to coming to the U.S. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2012) (describing the visa waiver 
program). Refugees, in contrast, pass through multiple levels of screening 
prior to their admission to the U.S. See Amy Pope, Infographic: The 
Screening Process for Refugee Entry Into the United States, The White 
House (Nov. 20, 2015, 7:09 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
blog/2015/11/20/infographic-screening-process-refugee-entry-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/QYQ4-95JH] (explaining the screening process).  
240. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11 
Geo. Immigr. L. J. 667, 672 (1997) (“When an alien initially comes into 
INS custody . . . the agency probably knows little or nothing about him. 
Moreover, the agency cannot readily obtain reliable information about him 
unless he has previously been criminally convicted or was otherwise in the 
custody of some government agency.”). 
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inspection and therefore are not deemed to be “arriving aliens.”241 The 
few steps they take into the interior of the U.S. means that they have 
a right to a bond hearing, governed by 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(a).242 While it is 
true that the entrant without inspection is an applicant for admission, 
and thus bearing the burden of proof, it is still the government that 
initially bears the burden of proving alienage in the removal case.243 
Thus, under my argument, the government should justify their 
detention by clear and convincing evidence. Would requiring the 
government to prove dangerousness and flight risk allow the release of 
a potential terrorist or violent criminal, who has not been screened for 
entry? For these noncitizens, if there is a real terrorism concern, DHS 
can seek to use the provisions for detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226A,244 
which appear to never have been used (probably because the 
government-friendly detention provisions of immigration law have been 
sufficient).245 If the concern is post-entry conduct such as crime, again 
the government can use evidence available to it to present to the judge 
why this detainee is a danger or a flight risk. 
Should we be concerned about using a heightened standard for 
proving a prospective act when, in a typical evidentiary trial, we are 
 
241. See 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2016) (defining “arriving alien”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.8(b)–
(c) (2016) (distinguishing between “[a]rriving aliens” and “[a]liens present in 
the United States without being admitted or paroled”). 
242. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (2016) (describing the circumstances of an 
automatic stay); see also X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005) (holding 
that a noncitizen in expedited removal but who is not an “arriving alien” 
may request a bond hearing once she passes her credible fear interview). 
243. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c). 
244. Congress added 8 U.S.C. § 1226a with Section 412 of the USA Patriot 
Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 412(a), 115 Stat. 350 (2001). Section 1226a allows 
for a noncitizen certified as a terrorist to be taken into custody and held 
until removed from U.S.; the certification may take place where the Attorney 
General has reasonable grounds to believe that a noncitizen is deportable on 
the basis of a wide variety of conduct. The certification must be reviewed 
every six months by the Attorney General and the noncitizen can submit 
evidence to rebut certificate; the Attorney General also must file a report 
with Congress every six months on the number of persons held and what 
happened to them. Id. at 350–52. 
245. See Wilsher, supra note 77, at 239 (discussing how the USA Patriot Act’s 
detention powers have not been used); David A. Martin, Preventive 
Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy Combatant Debate: 
Testimony Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, December 8 2003, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 305, 314 (2004) 
(same); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s 
Blind Spot, 113 Yale L.J. 1753, 1778 (2004) (same); Taylor, supra note 6, 
at 149–50 (same). 
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using evidence to prove past acts (like in a criminal case)?246 Predicting 
future behavior is very problematic, which is why scholars have 
critiqued legal standards that require either side to make predictions 
about dangerousness.247 However, notwithstanding these concerns, the 
law has set forth several places where predictions about dangerousness 
must be made, such as civil commitment and pretrial detention in 
criminal cases.248 The pretrial detention scheme is very similar to the 
bond context in that judges must make predictions about future 
behavior in a short timeline, when the investigation of the case is still 
underway and the need for quick resolution can justify fewer procedural 
requirements.249 If the government must prove dangerousness by clear 
and convincing evidence in the pretrial criminal context,250 there is 
nothing special about the fact that a person is detained for immigration 
reasons that makes him more of a danger to the community. In fact, 
these opposite burdens lead to an anomalous situation where the same 
 
246. See United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In a criminal 
trial the factfinder is required to reconstruct past events. . . . In contrast the 
dangerousness determination involves a prediction of the detainee’s likely 
future behavior. Such a prediction explores not the external world of past 
events but the inner territory of the detainee’s intentions. By its very nature 
such a prediction is a far more speculative and difficult undertaking than the 
reconstruction of past events.”). 
247. See, e.g., Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 46, at 308 
(“[G]enerations of scientists have explained that such predictions cannot 
meet the standards of science.”). 
248. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (“[I]n civil commitment 
proceedings the State must establish the grounds of insanity and 
dangerousness permitting confinement by clear and convincing evidence.”); 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749–51 (holding that dangerousness 
can warrant pretrial detention). 
249. Compare Chirinos, 16 I. & N. Dec. 276, 277 (B.I.A. 1977) (“Our primary 
consideration in a bail determination is that the parties be able to place the 
facts as promptly as possible before an impartial arbiter. To achieve this 
objective we not only countenance, but will encourage, informal procedures 
so long as they do not result in prejudice. . . . Obviously, this informality 
cannot carry over to a deportation hearing.”), with United States v. Smith, 
79 F.3d 1208, 1209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (permitting prosecution at pretrial 
dangerousness hearing to use proffers of facts because “to require the 
Government to produce its witnesses against him would complicate the 
hearing to a degree out of proportion to the liberty interest at stake—viz. 
the interest in remaining free until trial, for what is by statute a period of 
limited duration”). 
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (“The facts the judicial officer uses to support 
a finding pursuant to subsection (e) that no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the 
community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”); Salerno, 
481 U.S. at 751–52 (“The government must prove its case by clear and 
convincing evidence.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f))). 
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detainee is found not dangerous in a federal pretrial detention hearing, 
only to be released into ICE custody and found to be dangerous in a 
bond hearing because he now bears the burden of proof.251 
The analogy to the criminal pretrial detention context is not per-
fect, however, given that the flight risk concerns are different. 
Immigration relief is hard to win, especially when the noncitizen bears 
the burden of proof;252 thus, one can argue that these noncitizens have 
an incentive to flee, especially when the government does not have the 
resources to find and deport them.253 In contrast, in a criminal case, the 
government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that they committed a crime, making the pretrial defendant more likely 
to win if he appears.254 However, the consequences of a failure to appear 
are quite severe in an immigration case, given the in absentia removal 
order that usually results,255 which prohibits the detainee from seeking 
many forms of relief in the future256 and places the noncitizen in a higher 
enforcement priority category.257 
 
251. This was the chain of events that occurred in a bond hearing of a client of 
the Boston College Law School’s Immigration Law Group Bond Project. 
252. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2012) (describing when the burden of proof is on 
the noncitizen). 
253. See Written Testimony of Stephen Legomsky Before the United States 
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 25, 2015), 
https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/legomsky_testimony.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/MN63-HKUQ] (“Congress knows that there are about 11 million 
undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., and it knows that the resources 
it is appropriating enable the Administration to go after fewer than 400,000 
of them per year, less than 4% of that population.”); see also Schuck, supra 
note 240, at 671 (“[T]he INS can deploy few effective sanctions other than 
removal to induce them to comply with its proceedings and orders.”). 
254. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be found guilty of a crime). 
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
256. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B) (2012) (stating that failure to appear for 
a removal hearing without reasonable cause renders noncitizen inadmissible 
for five years); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(b)(7) (2012) (stating that failure to appear 
for removal hearing after notice bars a noncitizen from relief including 
cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, voluntary departure, change 
of nonimmigrant status, or registry for ten years). 
257. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of the 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_ 
memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/87E9-AKNF] (listing 
as “Priority 3” for detention and deportation those with final orders of 
removal). 
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The comparison between the pretrial criminal detention hearing at 
issue in Salerno with its heightened burden of proof258 and immigration 
bond hearings really is an “apples-to-apples” comparison when one 
considers that many immigration bond hearings begin and end with a 
dangerousness finding. The Board, in Matter of Urena,259 instructed 
judges to consider dangerousness first during a bond hearing; only if a 
judge finds a detainee not dangerous can she consider flight risk.260 The 
constitutional right to be free from detention requires the government 
to justify detention prior to a criminal trial based on clear and 
convincing evidence of dangerousness;261 so, too, should the noncitizen’s 
constitutional right to be physically free pending a removability finding 
require a heightened, government-borne burden of proving 
dangerousness.262 
Another question is whether it is truly the government seeking law’s 
intervention in the detention context—after all, it is the detainee who 
requests the bond hearing and is seeking review of a government 
decision to detain.263 He puts himself in the shoes of an appellant, asking 
 
258. Unlike dangerousness, which must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence, the government need only prove flight risk by preponderance of 
the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 
758, 765 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The statute does not establish the quantum of 
proof by which the government must establish this risk of flight. We adopt 
the position taken by the other circuits that congressional silence means 
acquiescence in the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard.”). 
But see United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(adopting a “clear preponderance” standard for flight risk and justifying 
higher standard of proof for dangerousness than for flight risk). 
259. 25 I. & N. Dec. 140 (B.I.A. 2009). 
260. Id. at 141–42. 
261. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court and burdens on civil 
detention). 
262. In 1997, Peter Schuck wrote a White Paper to the INS regarding detention 
and removal, stating that “facile analogies to the criminal justice 
system . . . may misconceive the rather different character of immigration 
enforcement.” Schuck, supra note 240, at 680. One of these unique features 
of the immigration enforcement regime was “the different constitutional 
standards applicable to removable aliens compared to . . . U.S. citizens.” Id. 
David Cole, however, has argued that with respect to the right to be free 
from physical detention, the Court always has followed the same Due Process 
analysis it applies to U.S. citizens. See Cole, supra note 46, at 717 (discussing 
when the Supreme Court has upheld preventive detention); see also supra 
Part II. 
263. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b) (2016) (describing required application procedures 
for an initial bond redetermination and appeal); see also Fatahi, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 791, 793 (B.I.A. 2016) (describing bond applicant as “[a]n alien who 
seeks a change in custody status”). 
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a judge to review the initial decision to detain.264 That a detainee does 
not have an automatic right to review of his initial detention decision 
is another problematic feature of the regulations governing immigration 
detention, since in the criminal justice system, the government may not 
detain a person without expeditiously bringing him before a magistrate 
to justify that detention.265 If one goes back to the initial decision to 
detain, it is the government who upsets the noncitizen’s right to live 
freely in the U.S., especially because when ICE makes the initial 
detention decision, it is basing its right to detain on charges of 
removability that have not been reviewed by a neutral judge266 (unlike 
the probable cause hearing in the criminal context).267 
There is also the legal realist perspective—that the burden of proof 
and standard of proof make little difference, and thus any correction 
made by a court will have very little impact in the real world of bond 
hearings. Indeed, some of the evidence that I have critiqued as not 
passing the clear and convincing evidence standard is similar to what 
courts have allowed prosecutors to present in pretrial dangerousness 
hearings.268 However, my proposal seeks to require the government to  
264. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) (2016) (describing the appeals process following a 
custody decision). 
265. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to 
extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”). The regulation provides for 
a determination of custody by an ICE officer within forty-eight hours of 
arrest (except for emergency or extraordinary circumstances); however, this 
regulation does not provide for expeditious review by an independent 
immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016). 
266. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2016) (“If the examining officer is satisfied that there 
is prima facie evidence that the arrested alien was entering, attempting to 
enter, or is present in the United States in violation of the immigration laws, 
the examining officer will refer the case to an immigration judge for further 
inquiry . . . .”); see also García Hernández, supra note 107, at 882 (comparing 
criminal justice and immigration process, where the government can “merely 
lodge an accusation that a person has violated the law”); De La Cruz, 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 346, 359–60 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting) 
(“Unlike the criminal justice system, the initial decision to jail a person is 
made by the very law enforcement agency which ordered arrest. There is no 
impartial magistrate or judge involved at that stage. The hearing before the 
immigration judge offers the first opportunity for an alien to appear before an 
impartial trier of fact.”). 
267. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114–16 (reasoning that to continue detention after 
initial arrest, the detached judgment of a magistrate judge is necessary and 
that the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause is insufficient to protect 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
268. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(permitting prosecution to prove dangerousness by proffer and not allowing 
defendant confrontation rights at pretrial dangerousness hearing); United 
States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396–98 (3d Cir. 1985) (same). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings 
130 
prove dangerousness in a bond hearing by clear and convincing 
evidence; courts can later sort out what “clear and convincing evidence” 
means.269 Courts can look to examples from the removability context 
where the type of evidence the government presents in their bond 
cases—namely, police reports and I-213 documents—does not meet a 
“clear and convincing evidence” standard.270 
The Court recognized the legal realism concerns when it required 
the government to prove mental illness and dangerousness by clear and 
convincing evidence in Addington.271 The Court reasoned that “the 
ultimate truth as to how the standards of proof affect decisionmaking 
may well be unknowable, given that factfinding is a process shared by 
countless thousands of individuals throughout the country.”272 However, 
the Court recognized that the “standard of proof is more than an empty 
semantic exercise”273 because “[i]n cases involving individual rights . . . 
‘[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places 
on individual liberty.’”274 
Conclusion 
In this Article I have set forth why detainees should not bear the 
burden of proving that they are a danger and a flight risk during their 
bond hearings in immigration court. There are multiple ways to return 
to the days of Matter of Patel, when there was a presumption of 
freedom. 
 
269. Courts have the discretion to question the prosecutor’s proffers in pretrial 
dangerousness hearings. See, e.g., Delker, 757 F.2d at 1395 (“If the court is 
dissatisfied with the nature of the proffer, it can always, within its discretion, 
insist on direct testimony.” (quoting United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 
1321, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982))). 
Also, not every court has allowed proffers in dangerousness hearings. See, 
e.g., United States v. Brunette, 839 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(finding that prosecutor’s proffer of facts to prove dangerousness had not 
“been prove[n] by any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence”). 
270. See supra note 222 (discussing immigration judges’ use of police reports 
and I-213 documents). 
271. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979) (discussing and holding 
that the clear and convincing evidence standard “meet[s] the due process 
standard” because it “inform[s] the factfinder that the proof must be greater 
than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other 
categories of civil cases”). 
272. Id. at 424–25. 
273. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) cert. dismissed sub 
nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)). 
274. Id. 
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Congress, the Board, or ICE could fix this problem. Indeed, in 2013, 
the Senate, as part of a comprehensive immigration reform bill, would 
have shifted the burden of proof back to the government in bond 
hearings.275 The Board or Attorney General Lynch could write a pub-
lished decision, reversing Matter of Adeniji and its progeny and res-
toring the presumption of freedom in Patel. DHS also could rewrite its 
1997 regulation to return to a presumption of liberty.276 
A judicial remedy appears to be the more imminent solution, since 
the Court may consider this issue in Jennings this term. There are 
various ways for the Court to correct this erroneous burden placement. 
From an administrative law angle, the Court could decide that the 
agency’s decision in Matter of Adeniji is arbitrary and capricious, since 
it represents an unexplained agency shift from the presumption of 
freedom in Matter of Patel.277 The Court also could use statutory inter-
pretation tools to hold that that Congress, when it last amended the 
discretionary detention statute, intended to incorporate Patel’s pre-
sumption of freedom.278 Or, tools of statutory interpretation suggest 
 
275. Noferi, supra note 11, at 560–61. The bill did not pass the House of 
Representatives; Representative Grassley, objecting to the bill, complained 
that it would impose “new, onerous burdens on the government when it 
detains undocumented immigrants, including those who have committed 
serious crimes and are aggravated felons.” See S. Rep. No. 113-40, at 174. 
Clearly, Representative Grassley did not realize that aggravated felons and 
many others deportable for criminal conduct would have their detention 
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), not this provision, which would have 
amended 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Nor is it correct to describe this burden 
allocation as “new,” since it existed in the days of Matter of Patel. See 15 I. 
& N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976). 
276. The American Bar Association Commission on Immigration developed the 
ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards to provide DHS with a guide 
for transitioning to a civil detention system that befits its civil detention 
authority; one of the ABA’s recommendations was that “[n]oncitizens 
should not be presumed to be dangerous or prone to flight in the absence 
of credible information establishing objective risk factors.” A.B.A., ABA 
Civil Immigration Detention Standards 8 (2012). 
277. See supra note 75 (discussing applying the arbitrary and capricious 
standard to Matter of Adeniji).  
278. The discretionary bond statute, 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(a), did not change at all 
when it was adopted in 1997, except to increase the minimum bond amount. 
Under traditional principles of statutory interpretation, “Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change . . . .” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also Negusie 
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 546 (2009) (stating the previous proposition from 
Lorillard). Thus, by preserving the language of former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) 
and re-enacting it as 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Congress presumably meant to 
adopt the Board’s presumption against detention established in Patel. 15 I. 
& N. Dec. at 666. 
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that because Congress, in the mandatory detention statute at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c), specifically placed the burden of proof on the detainee, it 
intended to not place the burden of proof on the detainee in decisions 
governed by the discretionary bond statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).279 The 
Court also could engage in constitutional avoidance,280 reading the cases 
laid out in Part II of this Article to determine that for the discretionary 
bond statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), to withstand a Due Process challenge, 
the government must justify detention by clear and convincing 
evidence. Or, the Court could apply Mathews v. Eldridge281 to find that 
an additional procedure—requiring the government to bear the burden 
of proof—satisfies its procedural Due Process balancing test.282 
 
279. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009) (citation omitted) (“[W]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it 
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress 
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); see 
also id. at 430–31 (noting that this is “particularly true” when the provisions 
at issue were “enacted as part of a unified overhaul” of the statute). 
280. This would be consistent with what Hiroshi Motomura has termed “phantom 
constitutional norms,” whereby courts have undermined the plenary power 
through statutory interpretation. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After 
a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 549 (1990). 
281. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
282. See id. at 335 (holding that procedural Due Process balancing test requires a 
court to evaluate the private interests at stake, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation, and the government’s interest, including costs to the 
government). There is a significant private interest at stake, since detention 
is a drastic deprivation of one’s rights. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 46, at 696 
(“Locking up human beings is one of the most extreme preventive measures 
a state can undertake; it should be reserved for situations where it is truly 
necessary.”). The risk of erroneous deprivation is also high in the bond setting. 
See Das, supra note 7, at 145 (“Detention decisions are thus prone to what 
commentators describe as Type I errors (or ‘false positives’), where the system 
results in the detention of someone who should instead be released . . . .”); 
Legomsky, supra note 6, at 547 (describing how false positives in the context 
of detention generate needless costs, including “the deprivation of individual 
liberty, the inability to work, socialize, or travel, the isolation from friends, 
family, and community, the reciprocal losses of those from whom the 
detainees are cut off, the economic losses for those detainees who would 
otherwise have been permitted to work, and the increased public costs of 
providing detention, paying public assistance to the detainee’s dependents in 
some cases, and foregoing the income tax revenue that the detained person’s 
employment would have generated”); see also Cole, supra note 46, at 696. 
(“When a judge releases an individual who in fact poses a real danger of future 
harm, and the individual goes on to inflict that harm, the error will be 
emblazoned across the front pages. When, by contrast, a judge detains an 
individual who would not have committed any wrong had he been released, 
that error is invisible—and, indeed, unknowable.”). Finally, as to the 
governments’ interests, the burden allocation ensures that the right people—
those proven to be a danger or a flight risk—are detained at the government’s 
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The Supreme Court has the opportunity to examine the burden of 
proof allocation when it decides Jennings v. Rodriguez this term. Hope-
fully the Court will restore Patel’s presumption of freedom for the many 
detainees seeking discretionary bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This 
decision would comport with Due Process and align the burdens of proof 
for both detention and deportation. Only then will immigration bond 
hearings begin to reflect the Court’s statement that “[i]n our society 
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial . . . is the carefully 
limited exception.”283 
 
 
expense. Also, the burden of proof is not as costly as other procedures, such 
as court-appointed counsel or additional hearings. See Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 766–68 (1982) (deciding under the Mathews v. Eldridge 
balancing test that requiring the state to adopt a higher standard of proof for 
termination of parental rights proceedings would not create any real 
administrative burdens on the state because, compared to other procedures 
like providing court-appointed counsel or providing additional hearings, 
requiring the government to meet a higher burden of proof is not particularly 
costly). 
283. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
